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On the average of the 102 years from 1873 to 1975, nominal income in the
United States rose 4.9 percent per year, divided between a rise of 3.1
percent per year in output and 1.8 percent per year in prices. The
corresponding figures for the United Kingdom are 4.0 percent per year in
nominal income, 1.7 percent per year in output and 2.3 percent per year
in prices. On the average, rising prices accounted for over one-third of
the rise in nominal income in the United States, for over one-half in the
United Kingdom.
These proportions varied greatly over time. For example, in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, prices fell from 1880 to the
mid-1890s while nominal income rose, so prices accounted for a negative
fraction of the rise in nominal income. In the United Kingdom, output
fell during World War I while nominal income rose sharply, so prices
accounted for more than the whole of the rise in nominal income.
The theory sketched in chapter 2 to interpret the division of a change in
nominal income between prices and output distinguishes between long-
run forces that determine what are there called the anticipated or perma-
nent levels of nominal income, prices, and output, and the shorter-run
forces that determine the discrepancy between the actual and anticipated
levels. It regards the long-run behavior of output as determined primarily
by real factors and of prices primarily by monetary factors. The shorter-
run discrepancies between actual and anticipated levels cannot be so
sharply dichotomized. The shorter-run movements in both prices and
output were treated in chapter 2 as depending on both monetary and real
factors, and as reflecting an adjustment process involving a feedback
from past observed values.
That chapter was silent about the chronological counterpart of "short
run" and "long run"—as is economic theory in general, since the distinc-
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tion is analytical and its chronological counterpart may vary from prob-
lem to problem or country to country or time to time. In applying the
theory of chapter 2 to our phase-average data on prices and output, we
implicitly treat the short run as corresponding to changes over periods
longer than a phase (which averages two years in duration for the United
States, 2.8 years for the United Kingdom). We are encouraged to pro-
ceed in this way by the results of earlier chapters, which show that the
adjustment to monetary disturbances is fairly slow, even in terms of
phases. That confidence is reinforced by the results of this chapter.
Nonetheless, there is no assurance that the conclusions we derive for
phases will apply, either in general or in detail, to the intracycle move-
ments lasting a few months or a few quarters. Though this caveat is
equally applicable to earlier chapters, it seems especially relevant to this
one, since the interplay between movements in output and prices has
been at the heart of much business-cycle analysis.
As we explained in chapter 2, the simple Keynesian and quantity
theory hypotheses can be regarded as special cases of the more general
theory. So also can a third simple theory: namely, that the division of a
change in nominal income between prices and output depends only on
the size of the change in nominal income (or what comes to the same
thing, depends on the same variables as determine the change in nominal
income, and no others).
1 This third simple theory can be regarded as a
particular extension to prices and output of the monetary theory of
nominal income.
Section 9.1 examines these three special cases in their most rigid form
and shows that all can be rejected, though the simple quantity theory
hypothesis conflicts with the evidence less than either of the others.
In the course of section 9.1, we uncover a tendency for observed price
and output changes to be correlated negatively instead of positively, as is
typically assumed in theories of general economic fluctuations. We ex-
plore this tendency in section 9.2, with special reference to purely statis-
tical reasons for the observed phenomenon.
Section 9.3, like section 9.1, is a preliminary empirical exploration of
one feature of the theoretical analysis, namely, the division between
"long run" and "short run." It explores that feature by examining how
the division of a change in nominal income between prices and output is
affected by lengthening the period averaged in computing rates of
change. The results are suggestive but inconclusive.
Section 9.4 constructs a framework for the further analysis of the more
general theory embedded in equations (12) and (13) of chapter 2, which
allows both anticipations about prices and deviations of actual output
1. In the linearized version in chapter 2, this special case is obtained by setting £ = 0 in
equations (12) and (13).397 Alternative Simple Explanations
from potential output to affect the division of changes in nominal income
between prices and output.
That framework links the analysis of the present chapter with that of
chapter 8. Sections 9.5 and 9.6 apply to prices and output separately two
special cases analyzed for nominal income, one that allows for the effect
of the current variables affecting nominal income—money and yields
(sec. 9.5); the other that expresses these variables in terms of current and
prior money and prior income (sec. 9.6). These sections use the same
variables for prices and output separately as were used in chapter 8 for
nominal income.
Sections 9.7 and 9.8 bring into the analysis variables special to the
division of nominal income between prices and output—in particular,
anticipations about inflation and the degree of utilization of capacity. The
results suggest that inflation anticipations are far more important in
determining the rate of price change than the level of utilization of
capacity.
9.1 Alternative Simple Explanations
The scatter diagram in chart 9.1 depicts the variable contribution of
prices and output to changes in income. The chart plots phase rates of
change of prices and output for both the United States (squares) and the
United Kingdom (triangles), and the mean rates of change for the United
Kingdom and the United States. War phases are circled.
The scatter diagram enables us to reject a number of possible simple
explanations of the division of the change in nominal income between
prices and output.
One possible explanation is that the same variables that determine the
change in nominal income determine changes in prices and output and
that they do so in such a way as to establish a one-to-one correspondence
between the change in nominal income and in prices and output sepa-
rately. In that case the changes in prices and output separately could be
predicted from the change in nominal income and the points in chart 9.1
for each country would fall on a single curve—in the simplest case, that of
strict proportionality between changes in prices and output, on a straight
line through the origin and the point designating the mean rates of
change. Clearly, the points do not conform to that explanation.
A second possible explanation is the simple Keynesian view that a
change in nominal income is wholly absorbed by output until the "point
of full employment" is reached, and by prices thereafter. In that case
rapid rates of growth of output (in the limit, infinite) would be associated
with low rates of growth of prices (in the limit, zero), and slow rates of
growth of output (in the limit, zero) with high rates of growth of prices (in
the limit, infinite). In terms of chart 9.1, the points would tend to cluster398 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
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Scatter diagram of rates of change of real income and implicit
prices, United States and United Kingdom, 1873-1975.
either in the lower right-hand corner (high output growth, low price
growth), or in the upper left-hand corner (low output growth or decline,
high price growth), with few or no points between the two clusters.
Clearly, the points do not conform to that explanation either.
A third possible explanation is the simple quantity theory view that
changes in output and prices are independent of one another; that
changes in output respond to changes in resources and technology that
alter the feasible output of the economy, while changes in prices respond
to changes in the quantity of money per unit of output. In that case,
changes in output would tend to be independent not only of changes in
the price level but also in the quantity of money. The points in chart 9.1
conform more closely to this explanation than to either of the others,399 Alternative Simple Explanations
since the correlation between price change and output change is clearly
small. Yet they do not conform fully to this explanation either, though for
rather different reasons for the United States and the United Kingdom.
For the United States, the correlation between prices and output is
positive for the period as a whole, including or excluding wartime phases,
and for two out of three nonwar subperiods; though for the pre-World
War I subperiod, the correlation is close to zero (.06) (table 9.1). The
other three positive correlations differ significantly from zero at a .05 or
.01 level. The one jarring note is for the period after World War II, when
the correlation not only is negative, but differs significantly from zero.
The correlation between money and output is consistently positive,
though close to zero (.03) for the post-World War II period, and is
consistently higher than that between prices and output. All in all, the
hypothesis that output changes are independent of changes in prices and
money must be rejected.
For the United Kingdom, the correlation between prices and output is
consistently negative, though only the correlation for the period as a
whole differs significantly from zero at a .05 level. The correlation be-
tween money and output is negative for the period as a whole and for the
Table 9.1 Correlations between Phase Rates of Change in Money," Nominal

















































































"Money series adjusted for effect of postwar readjustment and upward demand shift.
* Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 level.400 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
interwar and postwar periods, essentially zero for the nonwar phases, and
positive for the pre-World War I period. However, none of these correla-
tions differs significantly from zero at the .05 level. All in all, the United
Kingdom comes closer to conforming to the simple quantity theory than
the United States, but the consistent negative relation between prices and
output and occasionally even between money and output gives pause
before that interpretation can be accepted.
Chart 9.2, which replots the points in chart 9.1 as time series rather
than as a scatter diagram, reflects these correlations. For the United
States there is a positive correlation between rates of change in prices and
output up to Word War II, when it becomes equally clearly negative. For
the United Kingdom there is a negative correlation throughout, though it
is much more marked for the post-World War II period.
One other feature brought out by chart 9.2 is the greater stability of
output growth in the United Kingdom than in the United States—cer-
tainly if World War I is excluded. As table 9.2 shows, the standard
deviation of the rate of change of output is consistently higher for the
United States than for the United Kingdom. The difference is least for
the post-World War II period. For prices the situation is more compli-
cated. Prices were decidedly more stable in the United Kingdom before
World War I, somewhat less stable during the interwar period, and much
less stable in the post-World War II period. The roughly equal standard
deviations for the United States and the United Kingdom for the period
as a whole simply average out these substantial differences between the
subperiods.
For the United Kingdom, prices are consistently more variable than
output; for the United States that is also true for the post-World War II
period, trivially so for the pre-World War I period, and the reverse for
the interwar period. The greater importance of price change relative to
output change for the United Kingdom than for the United States is a
phenomenon that we shall document repeatedly in later sections of this
chapter.
The much stabler output for the United Kingdom reinforces the im-
pression from chart 9.1 that the United Kingdom comes closer to con-
forming to the simple quantity theory than does the United States. The
changing pattern of price stability presumably reflects the changed role of
the United Kingdom in the world monetary system discussed in chapter
7. Before World War I, the United Kingdom was the center of the
international monetary system; changes in internal prices generated a
rapid response in its international payments, so it had little leeway for
departing from the pattern of world prices in gold: the "law of one price"
operated with full force. The United States was more isolated; it could
have a more idiosyncratic pattern of price movement; hence prices were
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Time series of rates of change of real income and prices,
United States and United Kingdom, 1880-1975. Points are
plotted at the midpoint of central phase of the triplet from
which rate of change is computed.402 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output















































































aMoney series adjusted for effect of postwar readjustment and upward demand shift.
period was a period of transition, though the United States was definitely
assuming a larger role. Equally important,while the United States stayed
on the prewar gold standard until 1933, the United Kingdom was on the
prewar gold standard only between 1925 and 1931. So price variability in
the United Kingdom was moderately greater than in the United States.
After World War II the United Kingdom's role in the international
financial system continued to decline, while that of the United States
grew, as the world—at least until 1971—essentially adopted a dollar
standard. The United States was now more strongly affected by the "law
of one price"; the United Kingdom had greater autonomy, reflected in
occasional changes in official exchange rates before 1971, and subsequent
floating thereafter, and in the control of foreign exchange transactions
(until 1979). One result was that price variability increased in the United
Kingdom and decreased in the United States.
9.2 Price and Output Correlations
Most students of cyclical fluctuations doubtless share our own initial
expectation that on the whole price and output changes are positively
correlated; yet the evidence for the two countries combined is that the
phase rates of change more frequently show a negative than a positive
correlation. What explains this result?403 Price and Output Correlations
On analysis, the phenomenon that turns out to need explanation is less
the empirical result than the initial expectation. There are strong statisti-
cal and economic reasons to expect a negative relation.
Consider first the statistical reason. The three magnitudes—nominal
income, real income, and prices—are not statistically independent. In
general, nominal income and one of the remaining two magnitudes are
independently calculated, and the third is obtained by division. As a
result, errors of estimate of real income and prices are negatively corre-
lated.
The economic reasons are twofold. The first is essentially the same as
the statistical reason. Any economic force that impinges autonomously
on prices or output will tend to produce a negative relation between
them. A good or bad harvest, for example, that raises or lowers real
output without affecting, at least for the time being, the quantity of
money or any other determinant of nominal income will tend to affect
prices in the opposite direction. Only those autonomous influences that
affect nominal income spill over to both prices and output and introduce a
positive correlation.
But even the influences that affect nominal income have some effects
that may reduce or reverse the positive correlation. This second eco-
nomic reason, which is much more complex, arises from the difference in
the temporal reaction pattern of output and prices to autonomous
changes in nominal income produced by monetary, or indeed, other
forces. In general, output is affected sooner than prices: an initial accel-
eration in nominal income, for example, leads to an acceleration in
output after a brief lag (about six to nine months for the United States and
the United Kingdom) and has little effect initially on prices. Later the
impact shifts to prices (after about another fifteen to twenty months for
the United States and the United Kingdom). As prices take over, output
decelerates in response. The positive correlation between prices and
output imparted by a change in nominal income thus tends to be offset by
the temporal differences in response.
It follows from these considerations that a positive correlation is to be
expected only when the autonomous forces affecting nominal income are
sufficiently dominant to overcome both the statistical and the economic
forces making for a negative relation. And that is precisely what our
results show.
The only significant positive correlation between rates of change of
prices and output for a subperiod is for the United States for the interwar
period (0.78), and that is also the subperiod for which the standard
deviation of the rate of change of nominal income (and also of money) is
the highest: 4.56 percentage points, almost twice as high as the next
highest, 2.53, which is for the United States pre-World War I, the only
other subperiod for which the price-output correlation is positive(.06)404 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
(tables 9.1 and 9.2). At the other extreme, the negative price-output
correlation that is largest in absolute value is for the United States for the
post-World War II period ( - .60), and that is the subperiod for which the
standard deviation of nominal income (and also of money) is next to the
lowest(1.18). The lowest for both money and income is for the United
Kingdom pre-World War I.
A glance at chart 9.2 for the United States reinforces and amplifies this
explanation. For the period before World War I, the positive correlation
reflects the deep depression of the 1890s—an episode when there were
exceptionally wide fluctuations in nominal income as a result of auton-
omous forces—in our opinion, predominantly monetary—affecting
nominal income. For the rest of the period the correlation appears
negative. The essentially zero correlation for the whole pre-World War I
period reflects an averaging out of the positive correlation from the end of
the nineteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth, and the
negative correlation before and after that episode.
For the interwar period, two similar episodes—the sharp contractions
of 1920-21 and of 1929-33 and their aftermath—are the source of the
positive correlation. Again, these are episodes that were characterized by
exceptionally wide fluctuations in nominal income as a result of auton-
omous forces—in our opinion, again predominantly monetary—affecting
nominal income.
We suspect that these episodes—so dramatic and so important—ex-
plain our initial expectation that the correlation would be positive.
The one puzzle that remains from tables 9.1 and 9.2 is the relation
between the variability of money and of income. As the preceding
paragraphs indicate, we interpret fluctuations in the rate of change of
nominal income as associated with fluctuations in the rate of change of
money. As table 9.2 indicates, there is in general a close relation between
the standard deviations of money and of income. However, the relation
for the post-World War II period differs from that for the earlier periods.
For the United States, income is more variable than money for the
pre-World War I and interwar periods; money is more variable than
income for the post-World World War II period. For the United King-
dom, money is uniformly more variable than income, but the difference is
small for the first two periods—11 percent for the pre-World War I
period, 16 percent for the interwar period—much larger for the post-
World War II period—76 percent. For both countries, therefore, the
post-World War II period displays enhanced variability of money rela-
tive to income.
Chart 9.3 suggests that the explanation for this phenomenon is the
length of time that it took for both countries to readjust to the major
wartime disturbance of the monetary relations. In both countries that
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Chart 9.3 Actual and predicted rates of change of nominal income,
post-1937 phases (predicted from regression of pre-1937
phases of rates of change of nominal income on rates of change
of money in current and three prior phases).406 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
of money—that is, a larger rise in money than in income. The two panels
of the chart plot the actual rates of change of income and the rates of
change predicted from a regression relating the rate of change of income
to the rate of change of money in the current and three prior phases and
based solely on data for the period before Word War II.
2
Two sets of predicted values are plotted for the postwar phases affected
by postwar readjustment and upward demand shift. The points con-
nected by a solid line allow for these shifts on the basis of the effects of the
corresponding shifts after World War I. Since those estimated effects are
very unreliable, because based on very few observations, we also plot the
points connected by a dashed line, which make no allowance for the
shifts. Allowance for the shifts improves the predictions for the United
States. For the United Kingdom the allowance is in the right direction but
excessive in magnitude. For our present limited purpose, the predictions
that neglect the shifts are the more illuminating.
For both countries the predicted pattern is similar to the actual pattern
but differs in amplitude. The predicted is above the actual during war-
time—the counterpart to the decline in velocity—and then below the
actual after the war—the counterpart to the recovery in velocity. Income
did not rise as much as might have been expected on the basis of monetary
growth during the war, but it rose more after the war. The reaction took a
long time in the United States and even longer in the United Kingdom. In
the United States, the reaction was largely completed by the early 1960s,
in the United Kingdom, not until the end of the 1960s.
Once the reaction was completed, the actual is remarkably close to the
predicted, especially for an extrapolation of more than twenty-five years
for the United States and more than thirty years for the United Kingdom.
A particularly remarkable feature is that in both countries the agreement
is closer at the end of the period of extrapolation than at the beginning—a
rather impressive testimonial to the stability of the link between money
and income. The wider fluctuation of the predicted rates of change of
income than of the actual means that the variability of money relative to
predicted income would have been decidedly less than its variability
relative to actual income. It follows that the wider relative variability of
2. Whereas in most of chapter 8 and the rest of this chapter we have used rates of change
of money adjusted for the postwar readjustment and upward demand shift, for the present
purpose we did not, but rather included dummy variables for these shifts in the regression
equation fitted to the pre-World War II data. The reason is that the parameters used in
calculating the adjusted money figures are based on regressions for the period as a whole
and hence the use of the adjusted money figures would mean that the predicted values were
not based on completely independent observations.
The earliest rate of change observations we have for money are for phases centered on
1870 for the United States and 1881.5 for the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the period
covered by the dependent variable in these regressions is 1878 to 1937 for the United States,
1890 to 1937 for the United Kingdom.407 The Effect of Lengthening the Period
money after World War II reflects the war and its aftermath rather than a
fundamental structural change.
9.3 The Effect of Lengthening the Period
In A Monetary History we concluded that, over long periods, differential
rates of monetary growth are reflected primarily in differential rates of
inflation and have little effect on output whereas, over brief periods,
differential rates of monetary growth affect both prices and real income.
3
That is also the result implied by the theory of chapter 2. The question is,
How brief is "brief"?
As a first step to answering that question, we have computed rates of
change from groups of four, five, six, seven, eight, and nine successive
phases, so moving from the average span of about four years for the
United States or six years for the United Kingdom for our standard rates
of change computed from triplets of phases to an average span of about
seventeen (United States) or twenty-three (United Kingdom) years for
rates of change computed from nonets of phases.
4 The rates of change for
triplets and for the longest periods, nonets of phases, are plotted in chart
9.4—for money in A panels, for nominal income, real income, and prices
in B, C, and D panels. Some numerical results are given in table 9.3 for all
phases.
Lengthening the period smooths out the minor perturbations in the
money and nominal income series and significantly raises the simple
correlation between them: from .94 for triplets to .99 for nonets for the
United States, from .91 to .94 for the United Kingdom. Of more interest
for the present purpose, lengthening the period sharply reduces the
amplitude of the movements in real income relative to those in both
prices and money for the United States but not for the United Kingdom.
For the United States, the standard deviation of output is 74 percent that
of price for triplets, 39 percent for nonets; for the United Kingdom, the
corresponding percentages are 27 and 29.
5 In this sense our generalization
in A Monetary History is confirmed by the charts and the table for the
United States but not for the United Kingdom—another manifestation of
the difference we have been finding between the United States and the
3. A Monetary History, pp. 694-95.
4. The interval between the first and last phase in a rate of change computed from i phases
is (/ - l)n, where n is the average length of a phase, which is 2.1 years for the United States,
2.8 for the United Kingdom.
5. An interesting detail is that, to the three decimal places given in the table, the standard
deviation of prices is identical for the United States and the United Kingdom for each of the
seven period lengths—differences appear only in the (unreported) fourth decimal place.
This coincidence is a minor but impressive testimonial to the international character of price
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Rates of change computed from three- and nine-phase average
values, for money, nominal income, real income, and prices,
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United Kingdom in respect of the relative price and output reactions to
monetary change. For the United States, the residual mild fluctuations in
the rate of growth of real income remain positively correlated with those
in money. The simple correlation for nonets is .70, the partial correlation
is .80, holding prices constant. For the United Kingdom the simple
correlation for nonets is negligible and negative (-.10), though the
partial correlation, holding prices constant, is positive (.47), as in the
United States.
These results seem to contradict our earlier generalization that over
long periods rates of monetary growth have little effect on output. A
reconciliation is suggested by the dating of the residual fluctuations in the
rate of change of real income (see chart 9.4, C panels). For the United
States, the residual fluctuations reflect primarily the impact of the deep
depressions in the 1890s, 1920s, and 1930s; for the United Kingdom, the
one major residual fluctuation reflects the effect of the First World War.
In each case the smoothing process has spread the influence of the deep
depressions and wars over a considerable period, has shifted the dating of
the turning points, and, by averaging out the smaller fluctuations, has
given a larger role to these major episodes.
For the United States, the positive correlation between monetary and
real income changes for nonets of phases can therefore be regarded as a
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tory—the one-to-one relation between severe economic contractions and
severe monetary contractions, a cyclical relation of such importance that
it takes more than a seventeen-year period to average it out.
The generalization that sustained monetary changes are reflected pri-
marily in prices rather than in real income is strongly supported by the
final columns of table 9.3, which give regression coefficients and hence
measure quantitative effects. For the United States, a one percentage
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i413 Framework for Further Analysis
accompanied on the average by a 0.63 percentage point change in prices
and a 0.34 percentage point change in real income (the simple regression
coefficients), so that even for a span of four years prices account on the
average for nearly two-thirds of the total effect. The sum of the two
effects gradually rises from 0.96 for triplets to 1.04 for nonets, and the
relative importance of the price effect rises, so that for nonets prices
account for nearly four-fifths of the total effect. For the United Kingdom
the results are even more clearly in line with the generalization. The
output effect is throughout negative and small, while the price effect rises
from 0.91 percentage points to over 1 percent, and, as in the United
States, the sum rises from 0.85 for triplets to 1.01 for nonets. These
results reflect the consistent finding that the United Kingdom tends to
come closer to conforming to a simple quantity theory than does the
United States.
The changes recorded in the table proceed continuously so that they do
not permit a sharp demarcation between "brief" and "long"—the ques-
tion we started with. We shall explore this question further, and in a more
sophisticated way, in later sections.
9.4 Framework for Further Analysis
The theory outlined in chapter 2 implies that a permanent one percent-
age point increase in the rate of monetary growth will ultimately be
reflected in a one percentage point increase in the rates of growth of both
nominal income and prices, leaving the rate of growth of output
unchanged.
6
The proposition is a special case of the more general view that eco-
nomic actors are concerned with real variables and do not consistently err
in their estimates of real variables because of purely monetary changes.
Money illusion, to use the earlier terminology, is a transitory phe-
nomenon, if it occurs at all. Expectations, to use more recent terminol-
ogy, are rational.
On this view, the average growth of output over long periods is deter-
mined by real factors such as natural resource endowment, social institu-
tions, human capacities, technology, invention, enterprise, and thrift. It
is independent of anticipated changes in nominal magnitudes except as
they affect real magnitudes—for example, the real interest rate or the
real quantity of money.
Over shorter periods as well, output growth will be affected by real
factors. However, over such periods output will also be affected by
6. As to level of output, the effect would be to reduce the level of output properly
measured because the higher cost of holding money will lead to smaller real balances (higher
velocity) and hence to a lower stream of productive and nonpecuniary services of money
balances (see M. Friedman, Optimum Quantity of Money).414 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
unanticipated changes in nominal magnitudes. Deviations of nominal
income from its anticipated growth path, produced by deviations of
monetary growth from its anticipated path, will produce deviations in
output from the path that would be mandated by real factors alone.
The real factors that determine the potential output of an economy at
any point in time generally change slowly and gradually. For both the
United States and the United Kingdom, the absence of any secular trend
in the rate of growth of output indicates that the effect of these trend
factors on the growth of potential output has been roughly constant over
the century we study.
7
Occasionally real factors do affect output and output potential appreci-
ably over shorter periods. For the period we study, the most important
have been wars and, at the very end of the period, the emergence of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the accom-
panying drastic alteration in the conditions of supply of crude oil. War
affects output during active hostilities and, in addition, the destruction of
physical and human capital reduces potential output for at least a time
after the initial period of reconversion. The impact of OPEC is similarly
capable of being long lasting. However, that episode came too late to
affect our results appreciably.
Other real factors that affect output over short periods, such as
weather conditions affecting agricultural output and construction, labor
disputes and similar temporary disruptions of supply, or the bunching of
new innovations, can almost surely be neglected for our purpose. Our
data are for the United States and the United Kingdom as a whole, which
averages out many local real elements, and for cycle phases as a whole,
which further averages out transitory and cyclical phenomena. Of course
the averaging out is far from complete. The Great Depression leaves an
unmistakable impress on our data. But we are inclined to interpret that
depression as an example of a major economic movement produced
primarily by monetary rather than real phenomena.
Hence, in analyzing in more detail the division of a change in nominal
income between price and output change, we shall neglect all real factors
other than wars plus those that operate slowly or gradually. We shall
allow for wars by presenting results only for nonwar phases. That restric-
tion recommends itself also for a different reason—the questionable
reliability of the price series during wars even after we adjust them for
price controls.
8 We shall allow for the real factors that operate slowly by
including a trend term in equations based on observations for levels and a
constant term in equations based on rates of change.
7. The correlation coefficient between the phase rates of change of output and time is
- .084 for the United States, .022 for the United Kingdom, values that would be exceeded
by chance well over half the time if the true correlation were zero.
8. That problem also arises with respect to our post-World War II observations, but we
regard it as less serious.415 Framework for Further Analysis
Although we neglect other real factors that affect the division of a
change in nominal income between prices and output, we do not assume
away changes in output. On the contrary, we neglect these real factors in
order to concentrate attention on the effect of unanticipated changes in
money and nominal income on fluctuations in output.
Unanticipated changes in nominal income alter the demand for par-
ticular products. They affect output because sellers and producers of
these products have no way at the outset of knowing whether the change
in demand for their products is a change relative to the demand for other
products, to which it is in their interest to react by expanding or contract-
ing output, or a change in general nominal demand, to which the
appropriate response is an adjustment of prices.
9
In chapter 2 this effect was embodied in equations (9) and (10), or in
linearized form, in equation (12) and (13). These equations are:
(1) gP = gp + -n (gy -g*Y) + H (log y' - log /*)
(2) gy = gp + (1 " t|) (gY ~gy)-Z (log y' ~ log /•),
where the values with asterisks are anticipated or permanent values. The
first term on the right-hand side of these equations relates price and
9. An important source of misunderstanding about the distinction between "antici-
pated" and "unanticipated" changes is the failure to specify the time unit involved. Many of
the criticisms of "rational expectations models," and of their implications for policy, are
really criticisms of the implicit assumption in some of these models that the same time unit,
relatively brief, is relevant to anticipations for all variables. Longer or shorter time units
may be relevant for different variables. Anticipations in active financial markets may be for
very short periods, since commitments are for short periods, whereas anticipations are
likely to be for much longer periods for construction or labor contracts. Once this point is
recognized, much of the appeal of some simple rational expectations models disappears, but
so also do many of the criticisms of a more sophisticated use of the concept of rational
expectations.
A recent example is the criticism by George A. Akerlof of rational expectations models
on the grounds that they are inconsistent with relatively long spells of unemployment,
because they assume continuous market clearing. That is a valid criticism of models that
assume that anticipations are for brief periods, and that errors are serially independent. It is
not a valid criticism of models that allow for long contract periods. See Akerlof, "The Case
against Conservative Macroeconomics: An Inagural Lecture," Economica 46 (August
1979): 219-37. On the effect of contract length, see J. A. Gray, "On Indexation and
Contract Length," Journal of Political Economy 86 (February 1978): 1-18. See also note 33
below and sections 10.1.1 and 10.7.3.
Karl Brunner, Alex Cukierman, and Allan H. Meltzer have combined the distinction
between anticipated and unanticipated with the distinction between permanent and transi-
tory shocks to construct formal models in the spirit of the analysis of chapter 2 and this
section but much more detailed. See "Stagflation, Persistent Unemployment, and the
Permanence of Economic Shocks," Journal of Monetary Economics 6 (October 1980):
467-92; and "Money and Economic Activity, Inventories and Business Cycles" (March
980, unpublished).416 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
output change to anticipated changes in the corresponding magnitudes;
the second term relates them to unanticipated changes in nominal in-
come; and the third term relates them to the deviation of actual output
from permanent and potential output, itself the cumulated residue of
earlier unanticipated changes in nominal income.
1
0
Equation (15) of chapter 2 relates the unanticipated change in nominal
income to monetary change, in linearized form, as
(3) gY ' 8*Y = * (gMs ~ gMo) + * (log M
s - log M
D).
where the superscripts S and D refer to "supplied" and "demanded." In
chapter 8 we explored two special cases of equation (3), one that assumed
an instantaneous adjustment of M
s to M
D or of gMS to gMD and another
that corresponded to the monetary theory of nominal income. The results
were encouraging though by no means fully satisfactory. They gave
equations for nominal income and the rate of change of nominal income
in terms of current money and current yields for the first special case, and
in terms of current money and past money and past income, or current
and past money alone, for the second special case.
As a first step in investigating empirically equations (1) and (2), we
shall in sections (9.5) and (9.6), resort to the same special cases for prices
and output separately. This requires modifying equations (1) and (2) (and
their counterparts for levels) by setting £ = 0, replacing gY (or Y) by an
equation relating gY (or Y) to current money and yields, or to current
money and earlier money and income, or to current and earlier money,
and replacing r\ by a vector of parameters multiplying the individual
coefficients of the several independent variables used in the price and
output regressions.
As a second step, we replace equation (3) by the simpler version:
(4) gY-8i=V(gM-gtt)-
Equation (4) simplifies equation (3) in three ways. It neglects the stock
adjustment term on the ground that it is likely to be less important for
output than the stock adjustment term in equations (1) and (2) and, in
any event, is likely to be highly correlated with that term.
1
1 It replaces gM$
by gM on the ground that M can be regarded as predominantly exogenous.
10. These equations suffer from the defect discussed in the preceding footnote that they
do not explicitly allow for the time period that anticipations cover, or for the possibility that
different time periods are relevant for different sectors of the economy. That defect is less
serious for our empirical work, which uses as a time unit a phase, than for studies using, say,
quarterly data, because a phase is long enough to allow for the bulk of the relevant contract
periods, though as chapter 10 suggests, the defect is not completely eliminated.
11. Because, if past deviations of gM from g^ have, for example, left M
s above M
D, they
can also be expected to have left v' above y'*.417 Effect of Money and Yields
It replaces gMD by g% on the ground that, wartime apart, the real factors
affecting the demand for money can be regarded as changing slowly.
In section 9.7 we use the Phillips curve as a convenient device for
examining the effect of the degree of utilization of capacity and of
inflationary anticipations as approximated by a linear function of the rate
of inflation in the prior phase. The results are intriguing, enough so that
we are led in section 9.8 to introduce more sophisticated hypotheses
about the formation of inflationary anticipations. None of those hypoth-
eses proves nearly as satisfactory as the simpler formulation of section
9.7. However, the approach does yield some interesting results about the
role of capacity utilization.
9.5 Effect of Money and Yields
By definition, the sum of the logarithms of price and output equals the
logarithm of nominal income. It follows that, since current money and
yields have a consistent relation to nominal income, they must also be
related to prices or to output or to both.
For most of the previous chapter, we could separate the behavior of
nominal income from its division into prices and output by treating the
real income elasticity of demand for money as if it were unity. This
assumption enabled us to write nominal income as a function of nominal
money and yields alone, without also introducing real income, and it
meant that the rate-of-change equations connecting nominal income with
nominal money and yields would, in principle, have zero intercepts.
When we break nominal income down into its price and output compo-
nents separately, even the assumption that the real income elasticity of
demand is unity will not enable us to omit real income or to eliminate the
constant term from the rate-of-change equations. Consider equation (6)
of chapter 8, simplified by omitting the dummy variables.
(5) log Y = - \ogk + ilogM + (1 - a) logy - hRN- egY
plus the identity
(6) log P = logY-logy -log N,
where y is per capita real income and N is population.
Substitute equation (5) into equation (6):
(7) log P = - log k - log N + £ log M - a log y - 8 RN
-€gy.
Similarly, the rate of change equation becomes:
(8) gP = - gN + igM ~ « gy ~ S DRN - e DgY.418 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
Setting a = 1 eliminates the term in log v from equation (5) and reduces
it to the simplified form of equation (6a) of chapter 8, but it does not
eliminate the term in v from equations (7) and (8). The one simplification
it introduces is to permit per capita real income and population to be
combined in a single term corresponding to total output, and to fix the
coefficient of that term at unity.
Unfortunately, it seems undesirable statistically to include either per
capita output or total output in equations for prices (and conversely,
prices in equations for output). The reason is that the two variables are
generally not statistically independent. The estimates of nominal income
are generally derived independently, and then a separate estimate is
made either of output at constant prices or of prices, and the remaining
variable derived by dividing the nominal income estimate by the output
estimate or the price estimate. As a result, errors of measurement of the
estimates of prices and output are negatively correlated. We decided in
chapter 8 that this problem was significant empirically and seriously
distorted the direct estimates of equation (6) of that chapter. We resolved
it there by assuming a real income elasticity of unity.
We resolve it here by approximating population and real income by
expressions in terms of other variables. We show in the appendix to this
chapter (sec. 9.10) that if we replace population by an exponential trend
and assume that deviations of real per capita income from an exponential
trend (which can be regarded as an estimate of anticipated or permanent
or potential per capita output) are related to M, RN, and gY, we can
express equations (7) and (8) as
(9) log P(t) = - log kP - K3PZ - [gP + K5PZ] T{t)
+ £P log M (?) - bPRN(t) -























f (a + X,













4^ / "y 5
4 / v'
T(t) is the chronological date corresponding to phase t, and AN, Ay, gN,
and gy are the constant and exponential trend terms for the United States
in the equations used to approximate population and real income respec-
tively; A.3;v, \3y, k5N, and X5y are the excess of the corresponding terms for419 Effect of Money and Yields
the United Kingdom over those for the United States, and iy,hy, and ey
are the coefficients of log M, R^t), and gy(t) in an equation like equation
(9) for log y. Similar equations hold for output (see appendix equations
A14 and A17). In using these equations, and throughout the rest of this
chapter, we replace RN by Rs for reasons explained in chapter 8.
Table 9.4 gives multiple regressions for nonwar phases between nomi-
nal income, prices, and output as dependent variable, and (1) money and
trend alone or (2) money, trend, and yields as independent variables.
Only two out of each set of three regressions are independent, since the
price and output regressions must add to the income regression, but we
give all three because t values and standard errors of estimate are of
interest for prices and output separately. We have computed similar
regressions for all phases; also for three subperiods: before World War I,
the interwar years, and after World War II; and also for the United States
plus the United Kingdom, using dummy variables to allow for country
effects. As already indicated, we present the results for nonwar phases to
allow for possible wartime real effects. However, it is worth noting that
the level equations for all phases differ only inconsequentially from those
for nonwar phases. The rate-of-change equations differ more appreci-
ably, yet none of our major results would be affected by using all phases
instead of all nonwar phases.
1
2 We use in later tables some of the results of
the regressions for separate periods. However, they are individually
rather unreliable because of the small number of observations on which
some of them are based.
1
3 Similarly, in some of the later tables we use
results for the United States and United Kingdom combined.
12. The biggest difference is that for the United States, the coefficient of gM is greater for
prices, and smaller for output, for all phases than for all nonwar phases, a difference that
turns out to be traceable to the heavier weight in the nonwar than in all phases of the
interwar observations, with their two major contractions.
13. The maximum number of observations is as shown in table 9. N. 1 (fewer when lagged
variables are included).
Table 9.N.1 Number of Level- and Rate-of-Change Observations, by Nonwar
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e422 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
Table 9.4 confirms the quantity theory expectation that monetary
change affects prices more than output. In seven out of eight compari-
sons, the t value for the coefficient of money is greater for prices than for
output (the exception is for United States rates of change for the equation
including yields) and, indeed, for five of the eight equations, including all
four for the United Kingdom, the coefficient for output does not differ
significantly from zero at a .05 level. These results are in accord with a
more extreme form of the quantity theory for cycle phases than we
outlined in chapter 2—what we called in section 9.1 the "simple" quantity
theory—and tend to confirm our finding in section 9.1 that the "United
Kingdom comes closer to conforming to the simple quantity theory than
the United States."
Examination of similar equations for the subperiods shows that the
statistically significant coefficients of money for three of the four United
States output equations are produced by the interwar period. We have
four parallel equations for each of three subperiods, or twelve in all.
None of the eight coefficients for the pre-World War I and post-World
War II periods differs significantly from zero; all four for the interwar
period do. Similarly, the coefficient for a similar equation for the pre-
World War I period and the post-World War II period combined does
not differ significantly from zero. The different result for the interwar
period reflects the two major contractions (1920-21 and 1929-33) during
that period. The changes in output during those contractions were so
large that, as noted in section 9.3, even averaging over as many as nine
phases does not eliminate them.
The significant coefficients for the output equations for the interwar
years represent a conflict with the simple quantity theory; but of course
they do not conflict with the more sophisticated quantity theory outlined
in chapter 2. As we have repeatedly emphasized, we regard these major
contractions as a response to monetary disturbances that produced un-
anticipated changes in the quantity of money of sufficient size and dura-
tion to produce important effects on output.
Despite the lack of statistical significance of most of the separate
coefficients on money in the output equations, the results as a whole give
some evidence of a systematic influence both in the few significant coef-
ficients and in the generally positive signs of the coefficients. Six out of the
eight coefficients in table 9.4 are positive, and so are fifteen out of
twenty-four of the coefficients for the subperiods.
Including yields in the equations reduces the standard error for three
out of four price equations and for all four of the output equations.
However, some of the reductions are trivial. Similarly, only about half of
the coefficients of yields for the price and output equations are statisti-
cally significant at a .05 level. Nonetheless, it is interesting that some
coefficients are significant not only for prices but also for output. Indeed,423 Effect of Money and Yields
a few more of the coefficients are significant for output than for prices,
and for six out of the eight comparisons the t values of the yield terms are
greater for output than for prices. One other suggestive detail is that,
whereas the coefficient of Rs has a higher rvalue than the coefficient of gY
for three out of four price equations, the opposite is true for three out of
four output equations. While obviously not very firmly based statistically,
this result has considerable theoretical appeal. Rs is the nominal yield on
nominal assets; gYis our proxy for the nominal yield on physical assets; it
is therefore plausible that gY would have the greater effect on output, as a
better indicator of the incentive to expand or contract output. All four of
the coefficients of gY for output are positive, as this interpretation sug-
gests, while two of the coefficients of gY for price are negative, which also
fits this interpretation, suggesting that the output effect of a higher or
lower yield on physical assets more than offsets the effect on prices via its
impact on the demand for money. Note that the coefficient for income,
which reflects only the impact through the demand function for money, is
uniformly positive (though for one equation trivial in size), which is the
sign to be expected.
The tendency for prices and output to be negatively correlated, dis-
cussed in section 9.2, is reflected in table 9.4 in the standard errors of
estimate in column 7. If prices and output were statistically independent,
the standard error for income would be larger than the standard errors for
price and output separately.
1
4 Yet that is true for only two out of the eight
comparisons in table 9.4 (both for United Kingdom rates of change). For
the other six comparisons, the standard error of estimate is uniformly less
for income than for prices, and also than for output.
1
5 This result must
reflect a negative correlation between prices and output when the inde-
pendent variables are held constant.
These correlations between prices and output are given directly in table
9.5 both for all nonwar phases and for the subperiods. All but two are
negative, the two being for the United Kingdom interwar period for
levels and rates of change when money and trend are allowed for, and
even these are converted to negative coefficients when yields are allowed
for. This result is of course to be expected for the reasons outlined in
section 9.2. If these equations accounted for all systematic influences on
income, prices, and output, the only thing left would be measurement
error; and, given the calculation of either price or output as a residual,
any measurement error in one would be perfectly correlated negatively
14. Since alog Y = fiog p + °iog y + 2rlog P log y, <rlog P <Tlog y-.
15. For subperiods, the standard error is greater for income than for both prices and
output for four out of twenty-four comparisons (two for the United States, two for the
United Kingdom), less for income than for both prices and output for ten out of twenty-four
comparisons, and less for income than one of the others for ten out of twenty-four
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Note: See note to table 9.4.
with the measurement error in the other. Of course, the equations do not
account for all systematic influences, but comparing the standard errors
with our estimates in the preceding chapter of the order of magnitude of
measurement errors indicates that measurement errors may account for
an appreciable fraction of residual variability.
Table 9.6 summarizes the evidence from the regressions in Table 9.4
and similar regressions for the subperiods on the division between prices
and output of the change in nominal income accompanying a change in
money. One striking feature is the difference between the United States
and the United Kingdom. The percentage absorbed by prices in the
United Kingdom exceeds that in the United States in fourteen out of
sixteen comparisons. The two exceptions are for rates of change pre-
World War I, when yields are not allowed for, and post-World War II,425 Effect of Money and Yields
Table 9.6 Percentage of Nominal Income Change Associated with Monetary
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Note: See note to table 9.4.
when yields are allowed for. This is further evidence of the difference
between the United States and the United Kingdom remarked on in
section 9.1.
The only significant difference we have hitherto found between the
United States and the United Kingdom is in the elasticity of the demand
for money with respect to real per capita income. At first it seems that we
may have found another one here in the division of income change
between prices and output. However, the situation is more complex and
the evidence weaker than appears at first glance. As before, the major
difference between the United States and the United Kingdom is for the




Tests of the Significance of the Difference between the United States
and the United Kingdom for Relations between Nominal Income,
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Note: All variables are rates of change.
In making these comparisons, a country dummy was included in the United States plus
United Kingdom equations to allow for the difference over the period as a whole in average
rates of growth in output arising from the differences between the two countries in popula-
tion and per capita income trends.
account for 20 to 30 percent of the change in income for the United
States, but for 86 to 120 percent in the United Kingdom. There is no
doubt that the price-output response was very different for the United
States in this period than for the United Kingdom.
For the remaining periods there is nothing like so clear a difference.
True, for six out of eight comparisons in table 9.6 for the other sub-
periods, the percentage accounted for by price is greater for the United
Kingdom than for the United States, but some of the differences are
trivial and none anything like so large as for the interwar period. Table
9.7, which tests the significance of the difference between the rate-of-
change equations for the United States and the United Kingdom,
confirms this judgment.
1
6 Only the equations for price and output for all
nonwar phases, and for prices for interwar phases, differ significantly at
the .05 level. For the rest, the United States and the United Kingdom
appear homogeneous.
The United States interwar period is clearly unique. Its dramatic
character gave it far-reaching influence. It played an important role in
leading Keynes himself, and his American followers even more, to regard
prices as rigid and output as flexible, to interpret income change as
corresponding primarily to output change and not at all, or hardly at all,
to a change in prices. The percentages in table 9.6 for the United States
for the interwar period are certainly consistent with that view—but they
are the only ones that are. The rest of the data contradict the hypothesis
Keynes was led to formulate. But that fact has not even yet been fully
recognized.
16. These comparisons are restricted to rate of change equations for the reason given in
note 27 of chapter 8.427 Effect of Current and Prior Money and Prior Income
9.6 Effect of Current and Prior Money and
Prior Income
It is shown in the appendix (sec. 9.10) that, if we treat all phases as n
years in length, equations (9) and (10) of the preceding sections can be
expressed as:
(11) log P(t) = aP +fPZ + (a'P+fPZ)T{t) + bP log M(t) + cP log M(t - 1)
+ dP log Y(t-1)
+ eP\ogY(t-2)
(12)
+ cPgM{t" 1) + dpgyit - 1) + epgY(t - 2),
with similar equations for output. The relations connecting these coef-
ficients with the structural parameters are much more complicated than
the corresponding relations for the nominal income equation, because
the structural parameters for both the nominal income equation and the
price equation enter in.
Similarly, equations (11) and (12) can be converted into relations with
prior money alone, but again the coefficients of the money relations are a
function of both the coefficients of equations (11) and (12) and the
nominal income equations that are the counterparts of equations (11) and
(12). Equations (11) and (12) can be written as:
(13) log P(t) = 4 + k"PT(t) + .1 Q bP. log M(t - i)
and
(14) gP(t) = k"p+ iobPigM(t-i),
where
bpQ = bP
bpx =cP + dPb0
bp. = dpbi _ i + epbj _ 2 for i
(15)
and
(16) .X ftp. = ftp + cP + (dp + eP) I 1-w_
where bt in equation (15) are the coefficients of the nominal income
counterpart of equations (13) and (14) and the other terms are defined in
section 9.10. Similar equations are valid for output.
It will be recalled that
b + c i- n -t- r
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We concluded in the preceding chapter that we can regard the sum of the
b's for the nominal income equation as equal to unity. It follows from
equation (16) that the sum of the b's for the price equation is then an
estimate of the fraction of the change in income that is absorbed by
prices. Similarly, the sum of the ft's for the corresponding output equa-
tion is, under the same assumption, an estimate of the fraction of the
change in income that is absorbed by output. However, unless the cross-
equation restriction that the sum of the 6's for prices plus those for output
add to unity is imposed on the price and output equations in computing
them, there is no assurance that the two sums will add to unity. Rather,
they will add to the sum of the b coefficients from the income equation
calculated without imposing the restriction that those coefficients add to
unity. In that case the estimated fraction of the change in income
absorbed by prices is given by the ratio of the right-hand sides of equa-
tions (16) and (17), and that result will be consistent with the correspond-
ing fraction for the output equations.
Table 9.8 summarizes both the sum of the b's for the price equation and
the percentage of the income change absorbed by price change calculated
from the ratio of the right-hand sides of equations (16) and (17). The
results are remarkably consistent for different methods of estimation.
The estimated cumulative percentage change in prices, like the per-
centages in table 9.6, are uniformly higher for the United Kingdom than
for the United States for the period as a whole. However, that result is
reversed for five of the eight comparisons for which the interwar period is
excluded for the United States. For the estimated percentage of nominal
income change absorbed by price change, the relation is reversed for
levels, even for the period as a whole: the percentage change in income is
so much higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States that the
higher price effect constitutes a smaller percentage of the income effect.
We are puzzled by this result. The rate of change results seem much
more reasonable. When the interwar period is excluded for the United
States, the percentage absorbed by prices is consistently raised for the
United States but still remains below the percentage for the United
Kingdom. We found in table 9.6 that, for all nonwar phases, the various
estimates of the percentage of the income change absorbed by prices
varied from 40 percent to 90 percent for the United States, from 93 to 106
percent for the United Kingdom. The estimates in table 9.8 vary from 68
to 96 percent for the United States, from 84 to 114 percent for the United
Kingdom. When interwar phases are excluded for the United States, the
estimated percentage absorbed varies for the United States from 92 to
114, very closely matching the range for the United Kingdom.
The rate-of-change estimates for the United Kingdom in table 9.8, like
those in table 9.6, conform almost precisely to the quantity theory im-
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income associated with a monetary change. The estimated percentages
clearly do not differ from 100. For the United States, the rate of change
percentages are below 100 even when the interwar period is excluded.
However, they do not differ significantly from 100.
All in all, we conclude that if the interwar period for the United States
is treated as exceptional, the remaining evidence for both countries is
remarkably consistent with the quantity theory implication that a mone-
tary change should ultimately affect only prices.
1
7
The evidence is also consistent with the absence of any significant
difference between the United States and the United Kingdom in the
relation between prices and earlier money and income, provided the
United States relation is based on data excluding the interwar period.
1
8
Our judgment that the interwar period in the United States is excep-
17. This conclusion is in general supported by F tests of the difference between 2,bP. and
unity. Table 9.N.2 shows the results of those tests for the sums based on the indirect
approach. The only significant values are for the United States rate of change for all nonwar
values—which we attribute to the interwar period—and for levels for the United States for
all nonwar excluding interwar phases if transient effects are not allowed for—which reflects
a sum of fe's greater than unity.
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18. The tests of significance are as shown in table 9.N.3. All but one of the F's for all
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tional and our exclusion of that period from some of the statistical
calculations do not mean that we regard the period as unimportant or
uninstructive. On the contrary, its very exceptional character reveals
dramatically the power of monetary policy and monetary disturbances to
influence the economy—which was why we were led to devote nearly half
of the text of A Monetary History to these twenty years out of the
ninety-three years our History covers. However, just as wartime periods
are instructive yet may introduce undesirable heterogeneity and bias into
statistical analysis, so the United States interwar period requires separate
treatment rather than being lumped with the remaining episodes—and,
we may add, we suspect that it is better treated by the episodic approach
of A Monetary History than by the statistical approach of this book.
In chapter 8, we concluded that the cumulative effect of a 1 percent
change in money can be taken to be a 1 percent change in nominal income
(i.e., that Xb, =1), and imposed that restriction in calculating the reac-
tion pattern of nominal income in response to monetary change. It now
seems that, the interwar period for the United States aside, the cumula-
tive effect of a 1 percent change in money can be taken to be a 1 percent
change in prices (i.e., that 2,bP =1). Accordingly, we shall impose that
restriction as well in most of the rest of this section.
Table 9.9 compares the transient effect for prices with that for income.
For levels, the sum of the transient effects for prices for the United States
is in the wrong direction, negative instead of positive, yet statistically
significant for two out of the four comparisons. For the United Kingdom
the results are more nearly consistent with expectations. For rates of
change, which might be expected to give more reliable estimates of
transient effects, seven out of the eight sums of transient effects are
positive, and the one negative sum is not statistically significant, whereas
five of the seven positive sums are. The transient effect for prices is
sometimes higher than for income, sometimes lower, as is consistent with
our finding that output effects are small or nonexistent.
Table 9.10 summarizes the effect of allowing for alternative sets of
variables on the residual variability of prices and output. For prices,
money and trend are obviously far and away the most important vari-
ables, as has been true throughout earlier chapters as well. Allowing for
yields generally makes an appreciable improvement. Substituting prior
money for yields generally reduces the variability further, and allowing in
addition for transient effects uniformly leaves a lower variability than
adding yields to money and trend. This result is consistent with the
theoretical model that we used to justify replacing yields by prior money.
However, it cannot be regarded as strong confirmatory evidence for that
theoretical model, since it could readily be that earlier money is replacing
not yields but some other variable omitted in the money, trend, and yield
regressions such as variables producing serial correlation in prices. Un-433 Effect of Current and Prior Money and Prior Income
fortunately our data, even though they stretch over a century, did not
seem rich enough to enable us to explore such possibilities. The final pair
of columns, which include income in the first and second prior phases
instead of money in the second and third prior phases, give slightly poorer
results for levels and for United States rates of change, mixed results for
United Kingdom rates of change.
For output, the results for the United States are roughly the same as for
prices. For the United Kingdom the most interesting result is for rates of
change, for which all the measures are roughly the same. The rate of
growth of output in Britain from cycle phase to cycle phase—at least as
recorded in the imperfect figures we have available—has been highly
stable and not affected significantly by any of the variables, including
earlier income, implying essentially a series corresponding to a random
walk or white noise. It is noteworthy that the total variability of output
rates of change for all nonwar phases for the United Kingdom is not much
more than half the lowest residual variability for United States nonwar
phases. The situation is different for the rate of change of prices. Total
variability is about the same in the two countries—reflecting the "law of
one price." However, the variables we have considered had a greater
influence on United Kingdom than on United States prices, so that
residual variability is decidedly less for the United Kingdom than for the
United States.
All in all, we regard as the most reliable and instructive relations those
for rates of change for all nonwar phases for the United Kingdom and all
nonwar phases excluding interwar phases for the United States, as well as
the combination of these two.
Table 9.11 gives a different kind of summary of our results, namely, the
estimated reaction of prices and output to a sustained 1 percent increase
in the quantity of money. These estimates are based on the relations
summarized in the final two columns of table 9.10, except that the
restriction is imposed that the ultimate cumulative effect on prices be
unity and on output zero, in accordance with our earlier finding that these
theoretical expectations are not contradicted by our data. This table is the
counterpart of table 8.9 for income except that it is restricted to all
nonwar phases excluding interwar phases for the United States, and to all
nonwar phases for the United Kingdom.
Chart 9.5 plots the reaction patterns based on rates of change. We
regard these as most reliable not only for the reasons already cited but
because technical considerations prevented us from estimating a tran-
sient effect from levels for the initial phase in which the monetary change
is introduced. The price reaction obviously dominates. For both the
United States and the United Kingdom it overshoots, but not until the
second phase after the initial phase for the United States and the fourth
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Chart 9.5 Reaction patterns of price and output to monetary change:
United States, United Kingdom, and United States and
United Kingdom (based on rates of change for all nonwar
phases excluding United States interwar)
appreciable, output reaction is cyclical—first positive, reflecting the delay
in the reaction of prices, then negative, as prices take over, then again
positive.
These reaction patterns are suggestive, but we do not regard them as at
all firmly established. They are a highly manufactured product and hence
sensitive to small errors in the coefficients of the equations from which
they are derived. For example, the patterns for the United States and the
United Kingdom differ substantially, yet there is no statistically signif-
icant difference between the equations from which they are derived.
For the two countries together, the price pattern is very smooth, almost
approximating an exponential approach to equilibrium. The output pat-
tern remains cyclical as for each country separately and is quite sharply
damped. The transient component is small, as it is for each country
separately.
Though none of these patterns is statistically very reliable, they do
correspond to the kind of pattern of reaction that is suggested by the
theoretical analysis of chapter 2 and therefore give no reason to modify
that analysis. Accordingly, we proceed to a more sophisticated applica-
tion of it.
9.7 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations:
The Phillips Curve Approach
By assuming up to now that £ = 0 in equations (1) and (2), we have so
far ruled out the effect that A. W. Phillips
1
9 incorporated in his famous
19. "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage
Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957," Economica 25 (November 1958): 283-99.441 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations: Phillips Curve Approach
curve and that has played such an important part in the post-World War
II economic literature bearing on the relation between inflation and
unemployment. This literature has almost all been concerned with cycli-
cal fluctuations rather than the longer-term movements with which we
deal, yet it offers a convenient and familiar framework for investigating
the factors affecting the division from phase to phase of changes in
nominal income between prices and output. Moreover, as we have seen,
in these matters the "short run" may not be very brief chronologically.
In his original article, Phillips related the level of utilization of capac-
ity, which he measured inversely by the unemployment rate, to the rate of
change of nominal wages. He argued that a high level of unemployment
(a low level of utilization of capacity) was a sign that the quantity of labor
offered at the going rate exceeded the quantity of labor demanded and
hence exerted downward pressure on wage rates and conversely. Later
writers extended the relationship from wages to prices, on the ground
that prices move with costs and that labor costs dominate total costs. The
theoretical argument is unexceptionable if "wages" are interpreted as
"real wages."
2
0 However, Phillips himself, and for a long time most of his-
followers, interpreted "wages" as nominal wages.
It is interesting to note that in 1926 Irving Fisher studied precisely the
same statistical relationship but justified it theoretically in a very different
way, as an effect running from the rate of change of prices to employment
rather than the other way.
2
1
In terms of our framework, the Phillips curve explanation, if expressed
in linear form, can be regarded as a special case of equations (1) and (2) of
this chapter. If we replace gY - gy
 m equations (1) and (2) by its equiva-
lent from equation (4), they become
(18) gP = gp + ^(8M ~ 8*M) + €0og y' ~ log /*)
(19) gy = gy + (l-f\) V(8M ~ git) ~ €(l<>g / - log /*),
where T] is the fraction of an unanticipated change in nominal income that
is absorbed by unanticipated price change and W is the multiplier relating
unanticipated change in nominal income to unanticipated change in
money.
In the initial version of the Phillips curve, it was implicitly assumed that
gp = 0, though nothing essential is altered if gp is assumed equal to a
constant other than zero. In addition, its strictest form, which regards the
level of unemployment as the only factor affecting the rate of change of
20. See Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review
58 (March 1968): 1-17, reprinted in The Optimum Quantity of Money, pp. 95-110, espe-
cially p. 102.
21. "A Statistical Relation between Unemployment and Price Changes," International
Labour Review 6 (June 1926): 785-92, reprinted in the Journal of Political Economy 81
(March/April 1973): 496-502.442 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
prices, is equivalent to assuming v\ - 0. On these assumptions, equations
(18) and (19) become:
(20) gP = gP + Z log (y'/y'*), and
(21) gy. = gy + V(8M -gW-i log (///*),
or, since ¥ gfo = g$ and gy = gp + gy,
(22) gy>=-g*P + VgM-^o
This version is the obvious counterpart of the simple Keynesian
hypothesis. Monetary change impinges in the first instance entirely on
output, and affects prices only through the ratio of actual to potential
output.
"Unfortunately for this hypothesis, . . . evidence failed to confirm it.
Empirical estimates of the Phillips curve relation were unsatisfactory.
More important, the inflation rate that appeared to be consistent with a
specified level of unemployment did not remain fixed: in the circum-
stances of the post-World War II period, when governments everywhere
were seeking to promote 'full employment,' it tended in any one country
to rise over time and to vary sharply among countries. Looked at the
other way, rates of inflation that had earlier been associated with low
levels of unemployment were experienced along with high levels of
unemployment. The phenomenon of simultaneous high inflation and
high unemployment increasingly forced itself on public and professional
notice, receiving the unlovely label of 'stagflation.' "
2
2
Our data for cycle phases confirm this generally negative verdict.
2
3 To
fit equations (20) and (22), we need an empirical counterpart to y'/y'* in
addition to our rates of change of money, prices, and output. One
approach would be to treat v'* as an unobservable anticipated magni-
tude, as we have treated Y*. We have not followed that approach but
rather have interpreted y'* as corresponding to long-run potential out-
put , and hence log y'/y'* as the logarithm of the ratio of actual to potential
output, capable of being directly apprehended by the economic actors.
We have simply tried to find an empirical proxy for this concept. After
much experimentation, we settled on the logarithm of the ratio of real
income per capita for each phase to an exponential trend fitted to the
phase averages of real income per capita. The trend allows for slow
changes in productive capacity, the ratio to trend for shorter period
22. See Milton Friedman, "Inflation and Unemployment" (Nobel Lecture, 1976), re-
printed in Journal of Political Economy 85 (June 1977): 451-72; quotation from p. 455.
23. For the rest of this chapter, we restrict the empirical analysis to rates of change
instead, as hitherto, of making dual calculations for levels and rates of change. This
economy is justified by the earlier sections of this chapter. When the results differed for
levels and rates of change, we have generally decided in favor of the rate of change results.443 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations: Phillips Curve Approach
changes in the rate of utilization of capacity. We term this measure the
output ratio and denote it by Ry>{i).
u
Table 9.12 summarizes the estimates of equations (20) and (22), with
gp treated as a constant. For all nonwar phases in the equation for gP, the
coefficient of Ry> is positive for both the United States and the United
Kingdom. However, it does not differ significantly from zero for the
United States at the .05 level, and barely does so for the United King-
dom. Moreover, for the United States, the sign of the coefficient is
reversed if the idiosyncratic interwar period is excluded. For all three
24. The chief alternative we considered was the average fraction of the labor force
employed during each phase. For the United States, we use the complement of the
unemployment rate for 1890-1939 constructed by Stanley Lebergott {Manpower in Eco-
nomic Growth [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964], pp. 43-512) that he linked to the Census
Bureau's Current Population Survey P-50 reports for 1940-46; thereafter we work with the
figures given in Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress January 1979,
table B-27, p. 21. For the United Kingdom, we use the complement of the unemployment
rate for 1870-1965 in C. H. Feinstein (National Income, Expenditure and Output of the
United Kingdom, 1855-1965 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972], table 57, pp.
T125-27), extended by us for 1966-75 by adding figures for Great Britain (Annual Abstract
of Statistics 113 [1976]: 150) and for Northern Ireland (Digest of Statistics 47 [March 1977]: 8,
13) for civilian working population and unemployment to derive the United Kingdom
unemployment rate. We interpret a high fraction of the complement as meaning a high ratio
of utilization of capacity and conversely. We shall refer to this measure as the employment
ratio.
Neither measure is satisfactory—the output ratio, because a single exponential trend is an
unduly crude representation of the long-run change in productive potential, the employ-
ment ratio, because it refers to only one category of productive resources and, in addition, is
not very reliable statistically.
For the United States there seems a clear case for preferring the output ratio: first, the
output ratio is available for the whole of our period, the employment ratio, only since 1890:
second, the two ratios are highly correlated (for phase averages, .72 from 1890-91 to
1973-75; for annual observations, .90 from 1890 to 1975); third, a considerable number of
test correlations using the two measures as alternatives generally yielded more reasonable
and statistically more reliable results when the output ratio served as the measure of
capacity utilization.
For the United Kingdom, the choice is less clear. First, both measures are available for
the whole of our period. Second, the correlation between them, while positive, is much
lower than for the United States (for phase averages, .59 from 1874-79 to 1973-75; for
annual observations, .61 from 1874 to 1975). Third, in test correlations, sometimes one
measure yields more reasonable and statistically more reliable results, sometimes the other.
On the whole, the output ratio perhaps has a slight margin in its favor, but that margin could
be readily reversed by a different implicit weighting of the test correlations.
In the absence of a clear case for the United Kingdom, we have used the output ratio for
both countries in order to maintain comparability. We have checked to make sure that our
major conclusions would not be reversed for the United Kingdom by the substitution of the
employment ratio.
The output ratio has recently been used in related contexts in two articles in a single issue
of the American Economic Review 70 (March 1980): Vito Tanzi, "Inflationary Expecta-
tions, Economic Activity, Taxes, and Interest Rates," pp. 12-21; and Jeffrey Sachs, "The
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equations, the reduction in variability by taking Ry> into account is trivial
in size. In addition, while equations (20) and (22) have constant terms
and coefficients of Ry> that are equal in size and opposite in sign for the gP
and gy equations, all constant terms in table 9.12 are positive, and the
coefficients of Ry for the United States for all nonwar phases are of the
same sign for gP and gy. For the other pair of United States equations, the
two coefficients are opposite in sign and do not differ significantly in size.
For the United Kingdom pair, the coefficients are opposite in sign but
differ significantly in size. As always for United Kingdom output, the
series looks like white noise. At most, the calculations show only a trace
of a simple Phillips curve effect.
2
5
One reaction to the failure of the simple Phillips curve was an attempt
by many economists to retain the basic idea, by keeping TT| = 0, but to
eliminate the conflict with observation by treating the anticipated rate of
inflation gP, in equation (20) as a variable adapting to experience rather
than a constant. Such an expectations-adjusted Phillips curve is indirectly
a way to move from nominal wages to real wages.
2
6
This modification leaves a "short-run" trade off between the level of
unemployment and the rate of inflation because gp is taken to be rel-
atively sluggish, adapting only gradually to experience. However, taken
as it stands, equation (20) would deny any "long-run" trade off, since
once expectations adapt to experience, (gP - gP) = 0 and hence, with
•n = 0, log/ = logy'*, which means that there is no relation between the
absolute rate of inflation and the observed level of utilization of capacity.
(This has come to be known as the "accelerationist hypothesis.")
To retain the possibility of a long-run trade off, investigators have
rewritten equation (20) by attaching a coefficient to gP that can differ
from unity, but still assuming t] = 0.
In addition, they have kept the idea of a constant element in inflation-





25. The results for subperiods are consistent with this general conclusion.
26. For a fuller discussion, see Milton Friedman, Price Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1976),
pp. 221-29.
27. Stephen J. Turnovsky, "On the Role of Inflationary Expectations in a Short-Run
Macro-economic Model," Economic Journal 84 (June 1974): 317-37, gives an excellent
analysis of this approach and summarizes some of the statistical studies using it. His
equation (11) is, except for notation and a linear approximation to the final term, identical
with equation (23).446 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
Investigators have then explored whether ax = 1 in the long run. Most
have concluded that ax is less than unity, implying that there remains a
long-run trade off. However, this conclusion has been questioned as
reflecting both statistical bias and mistaken specification of the appropri-
ate test.
2
8 The essential criticisms are twofold: (1) That the statistical
studies have stressed exclusively the influence running from employment
to prices, neglecting entirely the reverse influence that is given primary
pride of place by Irving Fisher in his 1926 article. Essentially this criticism
is that it is inappropriate to treat y\ as equal to zero in deriving equation
(20).
2
9 (2) That the studies have used models for the formation of
28. For the criticisms, see Thomas J. Sargent, "A Note on the 'Accelerationist' Con-
troversy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 3 (August 1971): 721-25, and his "Ratio-
nal Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the 'Natural' Rate of Unemployment,"
Brookings Economic Papers, no. 2 (1973), pp. 429-72. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric
Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis," in The Econometrics of Price Determination
Conference, ed. Otto Eckstein (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and Social Science Research Council, 1972); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Some Interna-
tional Evidence on Output-Inflation Trade-offs," American Economic Review 63 (June
1973): 326-34; and R. Auerbach and R. Moses, "A Comment on Rothschild's 'The Phillips
Curve and All That,'" Scottish Journal of Political Economy 21 (November 1974): 299-301.
For attempts to estimate ax in equation (23) concluding that it is less than unity, see R. M.
Solow, "Recent Controversy in the Theory of Inflation: An Eclectic View," in Inflation: Its
Causes, Consequences and Control, ed. S. W. Rousseas (Wilton, Conn.: Kazanjian Eco-
nomics Foundation, 1968), and idem, Price Expectations and the Behavior of the Price Level
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969); R. J. Gordon, "Inflation in Recession
and Recovery," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1971), pp. 105-58; S. J.
Turnovsky, "The Expectations Hypothesis and the Aggregate Wage Equation: Some
Empirical Evidence for Canada," Economica 39 (February 1972): 1-17; S. J. Turnovsky
and,M. L. Wachter, "A Test of the 'Expectations Hypothesis' Using Directly Observed
Wage and Price Change Expectations," Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (January
1972): 47-54.
Three recent review articles contain additional references: R. J. Barro and S. Fischer,
"Recent Developments in Monetary Theory," and R. J. Gordon, "Recent Developments
in the Theory of Inflation and Unemployment," both in Journal of Monetary Economics 2
(April 1976): 133-67, 185-219; and A. M. Santomero and J. J. Seater, "The Inflation-
Unemployment Trade-off: A Critique of the Literature," Journal of Economic Literature
16 (June 1978): 499-544.
See also the papers and references in Bennett T. McCallum, ed., "Rational Expectations:
A Seminar Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute," Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 12 (November 1980, part 2): 691-836.
29. Some of the studies are subject to still other criticism. For example, Solow, in Price
Expectations and the Behavior of the Price Level, fits an equation like equation (23) except
that, to allow for costs as well as demand, he includes on the right-hand side the rate of
change of wages. There is no reason to expect ax to be unity in such an equation, which is
concerned with the margin between prices and wages rather than the behavior of either
separately. Let the anticipated rate of inflation go up by one percentage point but the rate of
change of wages be unchanged. Any resulting rise in prices would stimulate output by
increasing selling prices relative to costs, which implies that, even if ax in equation (23) were
unity, Solow's counterpart would be less than unity.447 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations: Phillips Curve Approach
expectations^) that may not be "rational," in the sense that they do not
involve the full utilization of the data available to participants in forming
their expectations.
3
0 This criticism applies equally to the adaptive ex-
pectations models that we have used in previous chapters and that we use
in the next section.
In a series of very interesting and important papers, Lucas and Sargent
have explored the implication of the rational expectations hypothesis and
have tried to derive empirical tests of the slope of the long-run Phillips




Their empirical tests use a different kind of information. For example,
one implication of a rational expectations hypothesis is that, in a country
in which prices have fluctuated a great deal, expectations will respond to
changes in the current rate of inflation much more rapidly than in a
country in which prices have been relatively stable. It follows that the
observed short-run Phillips curve will be steeper in the first country than
in the second. (We explore this effect with our data below.) Comparisons
among countries in this way, as well as other tests, seem so far entirely
consistent with what any reasonable person must surely expect: that,
since you can't fool all the people all the time, the true long-run Phillips
curve is vertical. However, the evidence is by no means all in, so we
cannot regard the matter as settled.
On the more limited issue of whether it is appropriate to regard r\ = 0,
and the output ratio as the major determinant of the deviation of the rate
of inflation from its anticipated value, we can alter equation (20) by
including a term in gM. For this purpose, a crude and yet simple way of
allowing for both inflationary anticipations (gp) and anticipations about
monetary growth (g^) seems adequate. Accordingly, we do so in equa-
tion (18) by approximating (gp — ^gti) by gP(t — 1) times a coefficient.
3
2
30. Note the words "may not be." The adaptive expectations models that we and other
investigators have used may or may not be "rational," depending on the assumed stochastic
structure of disturbances. Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer, in their formal models
constructed in the papers referred to in footnote 9 above, assume a stochastic structure
under which adaptive expectations are "rational."
31. This and the following paragraph are from Milton Friedman, Price Theory, p. 231.
The papers alluded to are: Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric Testing of the Natural Rate
Hypothesis," in The Econometrics of Price Determination Conference, ed. Otto Eckstein,
and "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in The Phillips Curve and Labor
Markets, ed. K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer (Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, vol. 1, 1976), pp. 19-46; Thomas J. Sargent, "Rational Expectations, the
Real Rate of Interest, and the 'Natural' Rate of Unemployment," Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, no. 2, pp. 429-72.
32. One way of rationalizing this approach is by supposing that gP(t) is a random walk, so
that the best estimate of g*P(t) is gP{t-\), and that gtf(t) can be regarded as a roughly
constant fraction of gP{t), so that a proxy for g%(t) is also a proxy for gP(t) -
 ini|/gJf(0- Of
course, there are many other possible rationalizations.448 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
The resulting equations are:
(25) gP(t) = ao + algp(t - 1) + r)tygM(t) + i R?(t)
(26) gy>{t) = ao' - algp(t - 1) + (1 - ^gM(t) - &y.(t) .
Table 9.13 reports estimates of these equations computed without the
cross-equation restrictions on their coefficients embedded in equations
(25) and (26).
These results make it clear that monetary growth is far more important
than the output ratio—in our terms, if either r\ or £ is to be set equal to
zero, far better to set £ = 0, certainly for the price equations. The only
statistically significant coefficient of Ry> in any of the price equations is for
all United States nonwar phases, and for that equation the effect is in the
wrong direction, the estimated £ being negative rather than positive—a
point to which we shall return.
For both price and output equations, the / value for the coefficient of
gM is consistently higher than for the coefficient of Ry>, and all but one of
the coefficients of gM is statistically significant. Not surprisingly, that one
is for United Kingdom output—a series we have consistently been unable
to explain. It appears, so far as we can tell, to be a purely random series.
The prior rate of price change has a statistically significant effect in all
equations other than the United Kingdom output equation. For all three
price equations, it is the single most important variable; for the two
United States output equations, monetary growth is.
For the United States, the coefficients of gP(t — 1) and gM are not
inconsistent with the restrictions embedded in equations (25) and (26):
the coefficients of prior price change for the price and output equations
are opposite in sign and not significantly different in size; the coefficients
of monetary growth add up to 1.07 and 0.94, respectively, which are
consistent with a theoretically anticipated value of ty of about unity. For
the United Kingdom, neither restriction is well satisfied—another exam-
ple of our inability to interpret real income movements in the United
Kingdom.
The residual variability is consistently lower, except again for the
United Kingdom output equation, than the lowest variability obtained in
table 9.10. This result may simply reflect the high serial correlation of gP.
However, it may also be evidence in favor of the validity of the approach
incorporated in equations (18) and (19), except for the condition that £ is
either zero or not well identified. To illustrate, consider the price equa-
tions for the United States, excluding the interwar period, and for the
United Kingdom for all nonwar phases, omitting, for both countries, the
statistically not significant term in Ry>:
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(28) United
Kingdom gP(t) = - 0.006 + 0.5S2gP(t - 1)
+ 0A22gM(t).
The first observation suggested by these results is that the two equa-
tions are very similar. They clearly do not differ significantly.
A second observation is that both equations imply that in the long run
(when gP(t) = gP(t — 1)), the difference between gM and gP is roughly a constant, the relevant equations being:
(29) United States gP(t) = -0.029 + 0.94gM
(30) United Kingdom gP(t) = -0.014 + 1.01gM.
The constant term in principle is equal in numerical value but opposite in
sign to the long-term rate of output growth times the income elasticity of
demand for real balances, which is close to unity for both countries. The
computed constant term does approximate the long-term rate of output
growth, which was 3.1 percent per year for the United States, 1.7 percent
per year for the United Kingdom. The coefficient of gM is not significantly
different from unity for either equation—the strict quantity theory con-
clusion.
A third observation is that, if we can take W to be close to unity, the
coefficient of gM in equations (27) and (28) is an estimate of r\—the
fraction of unanticipated change in nominal income (i.e., the difference
between actual and anticipated nominal income growth) absorbed by
unanticipated price change (i.e., the difference between actual and anti-
cipated inflation). The estimate is in the neighborhood of one-third for
both countries. Other studies have shown a strong and systematic effect
of unanticipated monetary growth on output but most such studies have
been for quarterly or annual data.
3
3 Our results suggest that the averaging
33. Robert J. Barro, "Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment in the United
States," American Economic Review 67 (March 1977): 101-15: "Unanticipated Money,
Output, and the Price Level in the United States," Journal of Political Economy 86 (August
1978): 549-80; Robert J. Barro and Mark Rush, "Unanticipated Money and Economic
Activity," in Rational Expectations and Economic Policy, ed. Stanley Fischer (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 23-48.
Robert J. Gordon, in his comment on the Barro-Rush paper (ibid. pp. 55-63) points out
that the evidence in these papers does not reject the hypothesis that anticipated as well as
unanticipated monetary changes affect real output, and he presents statistical evidence to
support his skepticism. Gordon's analysis and evidence are persuasive. We suspect, how-
ever, that the key issue is not "anticipated" versus "unanticipated" but the time period
discussed in footnote 9 above. Two time points are relevant: the date at which anticipations
are formed; the date to which they refer. A change at time t anticipated at time t— 1 may
have been unanticipated at time t-2. It will presumably not affect real output decisions
made at time t— 1; it will affect those made at time t-2.
Barro's approach defines "unanticipated" entirely in terms of a one-year time span.
Given the existence of longer term contracts, what Gordon designates as "anticipated" may451 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations: Phillips Curve Approach
involved in calculating cycle phases does not eliminate such an effect. As
we also noted in section 9.3, the period of adjustment to unanticipated
changes is surprisingly long.
One implication of the theory of rational expectations that was pointed
out by Lucas and mentioned above is that the response to monetary
change might well depend on anticipations not only about the level of
inflation but also about the variability of inflation. In an economy in
which the rate of change in the general level of prices has been highly
stable, anticipations about that rate of change might be expected to be
held with considerable confidence. Much new evidence will be required
before participants in the economy come to interpret changes in the
nominal demand for their products and services as reflecting changes in
the rate of inflation rather than in relative demand. Conversely, in an
economy that has experienced frequent and substantial changes in the
rate of inflation, participants will readily alter their inflationary anticipa-
tions. We would expect a changed rate of monetary growth to be reflected
initially more in output and less in prices in the first economy than in the
second (that is, we would expect i) to be smaller), and a longer period to
elapse before the change was fully reflected in prices.
Lucas explored this implication in terms of differences among coun-
tries. In an interesting paper, Benjamin Klein has done so for time-series
data for the United States.
3
4 As a measure of what he calls "short-term
price unpredictability," Klein initially used a moving variance of rates of
inflation. In his calculations for the United States with annual data, he
related this variable to "long-term price unpredictability" to show an
upward shift in the amount of long-term relative to short-term price
uncertainty dating from the mid-1950s.
well have been unanticipated at the time the contracts were entered into. An attempt by
Stanley Fischer to test the effect of including forecast errors for a two-year as well as a
one-year time span yielded a lower residual variability. However, the effect was small (ibid.,
pp. 234-35).
Our own results suffer from the same difficulty as Barro's but to a lesser extent because of
the longer and variable time unit.
In a recent article, Gordon provides independent confirmation, based on annual data for
the United States, of our estimate that about one-third of the unanticipated change in
nominal income is absorbed by unanticipated prices change. He writes: "nominal GNP
changes have been divided consistently, with two-thirds taking the form of output change
and the remaining one-third the form of price change. ("A Consistent Characterization of a
Near-Century of Price Behavior," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 70
[May 1980]: 243-49; quotation from p. 243).
34. "Our New Monetary Standard: The Measurement and Effects of Price Uncertainty,
1880-1973," Economic Inquiry 13 (April 1975): 461-84. Klein included his "short-term
price unpredictability" variable in demand for money regressions. The variable produced
an increase in voluntarily held money balances ("The Demand for Quality-Adjusted Cash
Balances: Price Uncertainty in the U. S. Demand for Money Function," Journal of Political
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Subsequently, in response to criticisms from Ibrahim and Williams,
Klein developed what he regarded as superior measures of expected price
variability.
3
5 We have calculated phase averages for both Klein's initial
variable and his subsequent revised version of short-term price unpredic-
tability (which we designate EVP), for both our United States and our
United Kingdom data, and have added EVP to the regressions for gy>
summarized in table 9.13 to test its usefulness.
3
6 Unfortunately the results
were not encouraging. The coefficient of EVP does not differ significantly
from zero for any of the three regressions corresponding to those in table
9.13.
These results do not invalidate the theoretical expectation that a high
expected variability of prices will make for a fuller and more prompt
adjustment of prices and a smaller adjustment of output in response to
changes in monetary growth. We suspect that our results reflect much
more the defects of the particular measure of expected variability of price
plus the small number of degrees of freedom available to test its role.
One bit of evidence that our negative results may reflect the defect of
our measure of uncertainty comes from a study by Donald Mullineaux of
the effect of inflation uncertainty on employment and output in the
United States during the post-World War II period. He uses two mea-
sures: "a moving-standard deviation of the observed inflation rate"—
similar in kind though not in detail to the Klein measure—and "a time-
series of standard deviations calculated from cross-section surveys of
inflation anticipations." He found that the second measure "significantly
affected unemployment and production" for both a longer (1950-75) and
a shorter (1958-75) period he examined but that the first affected them
only for the shorter period. Unfortunately, the cross-section measure of
uncertainty that he used is available only for the post-World War II
period, so we could not test it with our data.
3
7
A more promising body of evidence for a test of the role of uncertainty
over a longer period might be obtained from cross-country comparisons,
such as those suggested by Lucas.
35. See B. Ibrahim and R. Williams, "Price Unpredictability and Monetary Standards: A
Comment on Klein's Measure of Price Uncertainty," Economic Inquiry 16 (July 1978):
413-37; Benjamin Klein, "The Measurement of Long- and Short-Term Price Uncertainty:
A Moving Regression Time Series Analysis," Economic Inquiry 16 (July 1978): 438-52.
36. We are grateful to Klein and to Michael Melvin for constructing the relevant United
Kingdom series for us.
37. Donald J. Mullineaux, "Unemployment, Industrial Production, and Inflation Uncer-
tainty in the United States," Review of Economics and Statistics 62 (May 1980): 163-69.453 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations: Alternative Models
9.8 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations:
The Approach through Alternative Models
of the Formation of Anticipations
The results of the previous section seemed sufficiently encouraging to
justify trying to adopt a more sophisticated approach to the formation of
anticipations about gp, gp, and g%f than the assumption that gP(t - 1) is a
satisfactory proxy for gp - tuf/g^. Accordingly, we have considered a
number of alternative hypotheses in an attempt to approximate these
unobservable magnitudes. Though our experiment unfortunately turned
out to be unsuccessful, we did have one rather interesting by-product, not




only two of three anticipated magnitudes are independent. We have
earlier assumed that gy can be regarded as given by the Cagan-Koyck
adaptive expectations mechanism (see equation All in sec. 8.4). That
assumption yielded reasonably satisfactory results. We have therefore
retained it and concentrated here on gp, treating gp as given by gY - gy .
We list in the text below the alternative hypotheses we have consid-
ered, relegating the details about the equations that embody them to
section 9.10.5.
Unchanging Anticipations
The simplest approach is to suppose that economic actors treat both gp
and g%f as constants.
In view of the absence of any long-period trends in gy- and the depen-
dence of its secular movements primarily on basic institutional elements,
it would not have been unreasonable for participants to have regarded gp
as a constant, except perhaps during the wars. The situation with respect
to g% is very different. In the first place, gM has been much more variable
than gy (see table 9.2), so there is more incentive to take its fluctuations
into account. In the second place, gM is much more subject to direct
government control than is gy> and is known to be so subject. This
consideration is important for both the United States and the United
Kingdom after World War II, when both countries were explicitly com-
mitted to using monetary and fiscal policy to promote full employment. It
is least important for both the United States and the United Kingdom
before World War I. The United States had no central bank—though the454 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
Treasury Department acted in many ways like one—and was firmly
committed to an international gold standard, so that the quantity of
money was not a policy variable. The United Kingdom had a central
bank, but it too was firmly committed to an international gold standard.
For both countries, the interwar period is intermediate. In the United
States a central bank (the Federal Reserve) had been established in 1914,
but it was new and untried; it proclaimed its dedication to the interna-
tional gold standard until 1933; and it adopted a passive role thereafter.
Nonetheless, the existence of the Federal Reserve as an intermediary in
the transmission of monetary influences from abroad with the capacity to
sterilize or reinforce gold movements did significantly alter the deter-
mination of the quantity of money.
In the United Kingdom, despite the post-World War I determination
to return to gold at the prewar parity, the delay of the return to gold until
1925 and the subsequent departure in 1931 meant that throughout most
of the period after the outbreak of World War I, the United Kingdom was
on a fiduciary standard operated primarily to promote domestic objec-
tives.
We conclude that the assumption that g*> and g%t were treated by
economic actors as constants is plausible for both countries in the pre-
World War I period; more plausible for the United States than for the
United Kingdom in the interwar period; highly implausible for both in
the post-World War II period; and highly implausible for both during the
two wars.
Unchanging Anticipations for Output:
Adaptive Anticipations for Money
A more complex approach is to assume that the economic actors
regarded g*> as a constant but estimated g^ on the basis of earlier values
of gM, the kind of adaptive expectations we used for gY in chapter 8. One
justification of this approach is that serial correlations of gM tend to be
higher than of gy>; that is, earlier values of gM contain more information
about current values of gM than earlier values of gy> contain about current
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This approach leads to equations that are not linear in the parameters.
Hence we have had to resort to an iterative procedure to estimate them.
Adaptive Anticipations for both Output and Money:
Rate of Adaptation Equal (w = w')
Though gy> has no long-term trend, it does have considerable fluctua-
tions, and there is positive serial correlation between its successive values
(see footnote 38 above). Hence, a further complication is to assume that
the economic actors also estimate g*> on the basis of earlier values of gy>.
We again do so by Cagan-Koyck adaptive anticipations.
The simplest case arises if the weight (w') attached to the current value
of gy- in deriving g*> is equal to the weight (w) attached to the current
value of gM in deriving glf.
Adaptive Anticipations for both Output and Money:
Rates of Adaptation Not Equal (w=kw')
If w =£ w', the final equations are much more complex. Like those for
the second hypothesis above, they are not linear in the parameters.
9.8.2 Comparison of Alternative Hypotheses
Although we have derived in the Appendix (sec. 9.10) pairs of equa-
tions—one for price, one for output—we need estimate only one to test
the various hypotheses. Both contain the same unknown parameters, and
both will give the same numerical estimates because of the identities
connecting price, output, and income. We have chosen to concentrate on
the output equation both because it is generally the simpler of the two and
because the simple quantity theory implies that none of the variables
included in these equations should have any significant influence on
output (that is, on the simple quantity theory hypothesis, r\ = £ = 0). And
we have found repeatedly that the simple quantity theory hypothesis
comes closer to being satisfied than the other simple hypotheses we have
considered.
Table 9.14 indicates that for the United Kingdom none of the hypoth-
eses contributes anything to the explanation of the rate of change of
output for all nonwar phases. The simple quantity theory is confirmed
again—as we have repeatedly found with respect to output for the United
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percentage points; the lowest residual variability in table 9.10, which
summarizes the effects of allowing for money and yields, prior money,
prior income, and trend, is 0.60; the residual variability in table 9.13,
which allows for prior price change and the output ratio, is 0.65; and in
table 9.14 it is 0.62. Five out of six measures of residual variability in table
9.10, the residual variability in table 9.13, and six out of the eight
measures in Table 9.14 are higher than the total variability. The situation
is the same for interwar and post-World War II periods. For the pre-
World War I period, all the measures of residual variability in table 9.14
are less than the total variability and a number are less than half the total
variability. But these measures are based on only four to six degrees of
freedom and hence are at best suggestive. All in all, it appears for the
United Kingdom that neither the deviation of monetary growth from its
anticipated value nor the ratio of actual output to anticipated output has
any significant influence on the deviation of the rate of growth of output
from its anticipated value—or alternatively, that none of our hypotheses
about the formation of anticipated values provides a satisfactory approx-
imation. The only hint of a different conclusion is for the pre-World War
I period.
For the United States the situation is different—as is indicated at the
outset by the much greater variability of output growth (more precisely,
estimated output growth) for the United States than for the United
Kingdom. All but two of the thirty-five estimates of residual variability in
table 9.14 are less than the corresponding total variability, and many are
much less. However, it is noteworthy that only two of the measures of
residual variability for all nonwar phases and two for the period excluding
interwar phases are as low as the residual variability for the simple
Phillips-curve type of hypothesis in table 9.13. On the whole, the hypoth-
esis of adaptive anticipations for money (cols. 5 through 10) gives
appreciably lower variability than the hypothesis of constant anticipa-
tions (cols. 3 and 4) regardless of the hypothesis about output or the effect
of capacity utilization with which it is combined.
To go beyond that statement, it is necessary to separate the results for
an assumed zero and nonzero effects of the output ratio. For a zero effect
(£ = 0), adaptive anticipations for money, constant for output (column
5), is clearly the most satisfactory hypothesis: it gives the lowest residual
variability of any of the £ = 0 results except only for the idiosyncratic
interwar period. Moreover, the residual variability for both all nonwar
phases and for nonwar phases excluding interwar phases is lower than the
lowest measure in table 9.10 (0.98 vs. 1.15 for all phases; 0.91 vs. 0.95,
excluding interwar), and both are lower than the residual variability in
table 9.13 (0.98 vs. 1.10 and 0.91 vs. 1.20).
For an assumed nonzero effect of the output ratio (£ =/= 0), the hypoth-
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nonlinear estimation (column 6), which failed to converge for three out of
five sets of United States observations. Needless to say, we do not know
whether this result reflects a defect of the nonlinear program or of our
initial approximate parameter estimates, or whether it is a valid judgment
on the economic validity of the hypothesis.
It does mean that, if the output ratio is allowed for (£ =£ 0), our best
results are for the hypothesis of adaptive anticipations for both money
and output, with equal rates of adaptation (column 8). The residual
variability for this hypothesis for the United States is slightly lower for all
nonwar phases combined than the lowest measure in table 9.10 (1.12 vs.
1.15) and appreciably lower for nonwar phases excluding the interwar
phases (0.81 vs. 0.95), and both are lower than the residual variability in
table 9.13.
As between the hypothesis that is best when the output ratio is omitted
(£ = 0) and the one that is best when the output ratio is allowed for
(£ =£ 0), the evidence is conflicting. For the separate periods, the residual
variability is consistently less for the United States when the output ratio
is allowed for (column 8) than when it is not (column 5). That is also true
for nonwar phases excluding interwar phases. However, for all nonwar
phases combined the situation is reversed, implying that not allowing for
the output ratio gives more homogeneous results for different periods
than allowing for it. For the United Kingdom, the residual variability is
higher when the output ratio is allowed for (col. 8) than when it is not
(col. 5) for all nonwar phases and for interwar phases, lower for pre-
World War I and post-World War II. One further minor bit of evidence
for the hypothesis of column 5 is from the United Kingdom: it is the only
hypothesis, excluding those for which some estimates are missing, for
which the residual variability is consistently less than the total variability.
As further evidence, table 9.15 gives the parameter estimates for these
two alternative hypotheses. The estimate of I|J (the response of nominal
income to nominal money) is the same for both hypotheses. For com-
bined phases, the values of ij/ do not differ significantly from unity—the
result we have repeatedly observed. For separate periods, with small
numbers of observations, the estimates vary widely.
3
9
39. The estimates differ significantly from unity for both countries for the post-World
War II period and for the United Kingdom for the pre-World War I period. The low
postwar values are somewhat paradoxical and reflect the particular pattern of the postwar
reaction to the wartime decline in velocity.
The postwar rise in velocity at first suggests that the estimated ty should be greater rather
than less than unity. However, equation (A44) of the appendix is based on second deriva-
tives, the acceleration of income and money, rather than the first derivatives, the rates of
change. The postwar pattern was that the rate of monetary growth fell sharply in the early
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With respect to the remaining parameters, which differ between the
two hypotheses, neither set of estimates is very appealing, though the
estimates for the hypothesis of column 5 of table 9.14 seem preferable.
For that hypothesis, the estimated permanent rate of real output growth
is of the right order of magnitude—though perhaps a little low for the
United States, a little high for the United Kingdom. Similarly, w, the
estimated weight attached to current monetary growth in computing
anticipated growth, is reasonable, being consistently between zero and
unity and implying that the current phase receives from one-third to
four-fifths of the weight in forming anticipations about monetary growth.
However, the estimated values of -n, the fraction of an unanticipated
change in nominal income absorbed by an unanticipated change in prices,
seem much too low, only 19 percent for all nonwar phases for the United
States, and actually negative for pre-World War I and post-World War II
phases. That negative result implies that a monetary growth higher than
was anticipated would mean an inflation rate lower than was anticipated.
Though not necessarily inconsistent with the observed positive relation




For the hypothesis of column 8 of table 9.14, the estimated values of y\
are more in line with expectations, but those of w and £ are wholly out of
line. Only two out of the nine estimates of w are within the anticipated
zero to unity range; and only three of the estimates of £ have the
anticipated positive sign. The relatively good fit of the underlying equa-
tion for the United States clearly cannot be regarded as evidence in favor
of the hypothesis from which it was derived.
All in all, the results from the much simpler relations of section 9.7
seem much more in line with expectations. They too yield a vj; = 1, but a
value of t] of roughly a third.
We have here a special case of a general proposition: the same empiri-
cal relation can be generated by more than one alternative hypothesis. As
for a time, and then rose, though less sharply than money. This meant that acceleration of
both money and income was first negative, then positive, but the swing in money had a
greater amplitude than in income, thereby producing an estimated i|> less than unity.
40. The reason a negative r\ is not necessarily inconsistent with a positive correlation
between gM and gP is the assumed positive relation (indeed, equality) between g*M and gp
and the heavy weight of gM(t) in estimating gjvfW- F°
r example, for the parameters t\ =
- 0.28, i|/ = 0.97, and w = 0.58, a one percentage point jump in gM would increase gtt(t) by
0.58 percentage points and mean a deviation of 0.42 percentage points between gM and gtf.
That would mean introducing a deviation of 0.97 • 0.42 • (- 0.28) equal to - 0.11 percentage
points between gP and gp. If, before the disturbance, gP = gY - g*- = g% - 0.0281 = 0,
say, then subsequent to the disturbance, g$f would become .0281 + .0058 = .0339, and gp
would become .0058. Since gp — gp = — 0.0011, the final result would be that gP would be
0.0048, i.e., a one percentage point jump in gM would be accompanied by a 0.48 percentage
point immediate jump in inflation, compared with the 0.62 percentage point change in table
9.11 in the initial period.461 Effect of Output Capacity and Anticipations: Alternative Models
it happens, the hypotheses underlying columns 5 and 8 of table 9.14 yield
equations in observable variables very similar to some of those consid-
ered in section 9.6, namely, relating current output growth to earlier
growth in money and income. The key difference for column 5 is the
inclusion of an earlier value of output growth rather than of nominal
income growth. The minor improvement in results presumably reflects
the serial correlation of output growth from phase to phase. The key
difference for column 8 is the inclusion of the current and lagged output
ratio in addition to earlier monetary growth. In both cases, the variables
that make a difference are only very loosely related to our alternative
assumptions about the formation of anticipations.
We conclude that, while our results may give some evidence on the role
of the output ratio, they do not provide any reliable evidence on the
process of the formation of anticipations. From that point of view we
must simply record an unsuccessful experiment.
The evidence on the role of the output ratio is provided by the esti-
mated values of £—which measure the response of output and prices to
the output ratio. A positive £, the sign to be expected on Phillips-curve
lines, means that a high ratio of output stimulates inflation relative to
output growth; a low ratio means the reverse. The fascinating feature of
the values given in table 9.15 is that they are generally negative rather
than positive. Instead of a high ratio of output to capacity tending to
increase the price response and reduce the output response to a change in
monetary growth, it appears to have precisely the opposite effect. For the
United States, the negative values for combined periods (the first two
lines of table 9.15) differ significantly from zero; for the United Kingdom
the negative value does not.
4
1 The one appreciable exception is for the
United States interwar period, for which the estimated value of £ is
positive and significantly different from zero at a .05 level.
4
2
These are fascinating results. First, they reinforce the conclusion of
section 9.5 that the United States interwar period is both idiosyncratic
and the only period that is consistent with the Keynesian analysis—in this
case, the post-Keynesian analysis embodied in the so-called Phillips
curve. In the second place, they suggest that, for the other periods, the




41. The absolute value of t for these three estimates of £ are 2.4, 3.7, and 0.6; the first is
significant at a .05 level, the second at a .01 level.
42. The t value is 3.8 and there are 4 degrees of freedom.
43. This conclusion, based on the equation underlying column 8 of table 9.14, is also
consistent with the estimates of £ based on the equations corresponding to columns 4,6, and
10. Out of twenty such estimates, 13 are negative, seven positive; and of the four that are
statistically significantly different from zero at a .05 level, all are negative. For the United
Kingdom separately, the evidence is weaker, as is to be expected from the lack of statistical
significance of most of the regressions. Of the ten estimates for the United Kingdom for462 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
This result, though wholly out of tune with professional views in the
1950s and 1960s, seems far less so from the perspective of the late 1970s.
As the postwar period unfolded, higher inflation tended to be accompa-
nied by higher, not lower, unemployment, leading to the hypothesis of a
positively sloped Phillips curve.
4
4 Our results suggest that that hypothesis
may apply over a much longer time span than the post-World War II
period alone. However, we hasten to repeat that our evidence on this
particular point is weak and is suggestive rather than conclusive.
9.9 Conclusion
The results of this chapter are at the same time disappointing and most
informative.
They are disappointing because we have not succeeded, as we had
hoped we would, in giving satisfactory empirical content to the sophisti-
cated theoretical analysis in chapter 2 bearing on the division over short
periods of a change in nominal income between prices and output. The
empirical analysis in section 9.8 comes closest in sophistication to the
theoretical analysis—yet that section, while it yields some fascinating
results, also records an unsuccessful experiment.
One possible interpretation of our failure to give satisfactory empirical
content to the theoretical analysis is a point noted at the outset of this
chapter—that we have used too lengthy a unit of observation, and that a
similar empirical analysis using monthly or quarterly data might uncover
empirical intracycle relations corresponding to our theoretical hypoth-
esis. The results of section 9.3, on the effect of lengthening the period, as
well as the many regressions in this and previous chapters using observa-
tions for earlier phases, rather argue against that interpretation. We have
repeatedly found that the adjustment time is long, to be measured in
cycle phases, not in months. Nonetheless, it may be that, for the particu-
equations corresponding to columns 4, 6, and 10, five are positive, five negative. However,
the only one significantly different from zero at the .05 level is negative.
The only bit of contradictory evidence comes from equations for the United Kingdom
corresponding to columns 4 and 8 of table 9.14, but using the employment ratio rather than
the output ratio. While for the output ratio four of the eight estimates are positive, four are
negative, and none is statistically significantly different from zero, for the employment
ratio, five of the eight estimates are positive, three are negative, and one differs significantly
from zero; that one is positive, and is for all nonwar phases and the equation corresponding
to column 8. (The estimated value of £ is 0.31, and the t value is 2.3, with 19 degrees of
freedom.) However, the equation involved has a residual standard error higher than the
initial standard deviation, so this result does not deserve much confidence; presumably, it
reflects intercorrelations among the independent variables rather than a relation to the
dependent variable.
44. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Milton Friedman, "Inflation and Unem-
ployment," referred to in note 22 above.463 Conclusion
lar problem of the relative roles of prices and output, timing differences
measured in months are vital, and that these are obliterated by our phase
bases.
The results are informative in three rather different ways: (1) they
narrow sharply the phenomena requiring explanation; (2) they suggest
that much "conventional wisdom" reflects overgeneralization of a special
case; and (3) they suggest that what "conventional wisdom" currently
regards as a special case may be the norm.
1. For the United Kingdom there seems little if any relation between
monetary change and output: a simple quantity theory that regards price
change as determined primarily by monetary change and output by
independent other factors fits the evidence for the period as a whole
(excluding wars, which we have largely omitted from our analysis). The
whole of a change in the quantity of money is absorbed sooner or later by
prices and, in the early stages, more by changes in velocity than by
changes in output. The output series bears little or no relation to any
monetary factors, either the quantity of money, in the current or prior
phases, or yields. From that point of view, the rate of change of output
appears to be a random series (though not one displaying complete serial
independence). Finally, the rate of change of output is much less variable
over time than the rate of change of prices. Its variability is of the same
order of magnitude as that which would be produced simply by measure-
ment error.
For the United States, for the period as a whole, there is a positive
relation between monetary change and output change, and price change
absorbs a smaller percentage than in the United Kingdom of the change
in the quantity of money, and of the related change in nominal income. In
sharp contrast to the United Kingdom, the rate of change of output is
more variable than the rate of change of prices.
On further examination, and this leads on to point 2, it turns out that
much of the difference between the United States and the United King-
dom reflects the United States interwar period—a twenty-year span
containing three major contractions. That period seems idiosyncratic. If
it is omitted, and the pre-World War I and post-World War II periods
combined, the two periods together conform to a simple quantity theory
about as well as the United Kingdom data for the period as a whole.
Indeed, we cannot find any statistically significant difference between the
United States and the United Kingdom relations—though it does remain
true that the rate of change of output varies more than the rate of change
of prices in the United States and less in the United Kingdom.
We must confess to being surprised at our failure—if the United States
interwar period is excluded—to find a positive relation between price
change and output change. Misled by the "conventional wisdom," we
expected a positive relation between price and output change and be-464 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
tween both and monetary change, and we searched long and diligently—
and we believe, not simple-mindedly—to uncover such a relation. On the
contrary, a negative relation between price and output change is more
typical, for both statistical and economic reasons (section 9.2). We are
reminded of Keynes's dictum expressed in another connection:
I find myself moved, not for the first time, to remind contemporary
economists that the classical teaching embodied some permanent
truths of great significance, which we are liable today to overlook
because we associate them with other doctrines which we cannot now
accept without much qualification. There are in these matters deep
undercurrents at work, natural forces, or even the invisible hand,
which are operating towards equilibrium.
4
5
2. We have concluded that the widely held belief in a positive relation
between price and output change and in the inadequacy of the quantity
theory stems largely from a tendency to regard the United States interwar
period as the norm rather than, as we found it, idiosyncratic. That period
generated Keynes's General Theory and sparked the Keynesian revolu-
tion. It appears that Keynes's theory, far from being general, is highly
special, a view that has often been expressed but seldom documented as
fully as we believe we have been able to.
3. One of the most important of the by-products of the Keynesian
revolution was the "Phillips curve"—the notion that there is a stable
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment and conversely; or,
equivalently, that a high level of output relative to capacity (the output
ratio) will be reflected in a high level of inflation, a low output ratio in a
low level of inflation.
This relation has clearly broken down in the postwar period as country
after country has experienced stagflation—higher inflation accompanied
by higher unemployment, not lower. However, this empirical positively
sloped Phillips curve has been regarded as an exception, and the postwar
period as idiosyncratic.
Sections 9.7 and 9.8 indicate that this conclusion is not justified.
Section 9.7 demonstrates rather decisively that past price change is far
more important than the output ratio as a determinant of inflation.
Section 9.8 demonstrates that, insofar as there is any relation between the
output ratio and inflation, it is in the direction called for by a positively
sloped Phillips curve. This is true not solely for the post-World War II
period but throughout—the idiosyncratic interwar period for the United
States alone excepted.
45. J. M. Keynes, "The Balance of Payments of the United States," Economic Journal 56
(June 1946): 172-87. Quotation is from p. 185.465 Appendix
9.10 Appendix: Derivation of Price and Output Relations
9.10.1 Relation of Prices and Output to Real per Capita
Income and Yields
To convert the equations in the appendix to chapter 8 into equations
for prices and output separately, we make use of the identities:
(Al) log Y(t) = log P(t) + log y(t) + log N(t),
where N is population,
and
(A2) gY(t) = gP(t) + gy(t) + gN(t).
Start with equation (A5) of chapter 8, which is
(A3) log Y(i) = - [log k + \3Z] + 5 log M{t)
+ (1 - a - \4Z) log y(t)
- egY(t),
and subtract log y(t) + log N(t) from both sides. This gives
(A4) log P(t) = - [log k + X3Z] - log N(t) + I log M{t)
- (a + \4Z) log y(t)
Subtract log P(t) from both sides of equation (Al). This gives
(A5) log v'(r) = log y(t) + log N(t).
Similarly for rate of change equations, we start with equation (AS) of
the appendix to chapter 8, or
(A6) gY(t) = igM(t) + (1 - a - \4Z)gy(t) - hD[RM]
-*D[gY(t)),
and subtract gy(f) + g^t) to get
(A7) gP(t) = igM(i) - (a + X4Z)gy(t) - gN(t) - W[RN(t)] -eD[gY(t)].
Subtract gP(t) from both sides of equation (A2). This gives
(A8) 8y>(t)=gy{t)+gN(t).
These equations make one point explicit: even if a = 1, the behavior of
real output per capita and of population cannot be neglected in discussing
the breakdown of nominal income between prices and output.
To determine the influence of the variables so far discussed on the
breakdown between prices and output, we must express logy and log TV as
functions of these variables.466 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
With respect to population, we found in chapter 5 that population
contributed a trivial fraction of the variation of money and income about
their trend. Accordingly, we shall assume that we can represent popula-
tion by
(A9) log N(t) =AN + X3NZ + [gN + \5NZ]T(t),
where T(t)is the chronological date corresponding to the midpoint of
phase t. The parameter \3N is the excess of the constant term of the trend
equation for the United Kingdom over that for the United States, \5N is
the excess of the slope term, and similarly with subsequent coefficients of
Z.
By differentiating equation (A9) with respect to T, we can represent
the rate of change of population by
(A10) gM = gN + \5NZ.
With respect to real income per capita, we cannot neglect the devia-
tions from trend, but we can assume that they are related to variables
affecting nominal income, namely, M(t), Rj^t), and gy{t), and that the
relation is the same in the United States and the United Kingdom. On
that assumption, we can represent per capita income by
(All) log y(t) =Ay + \3yZ + (gy + \5yZ) T(t) + iy log M{t)
- SyRN(t) - eygY{t),
and the rate of change of real income per capita by
(A12) gy(t) = % + X5yZ) + iygM(t) ~ *yD[
RM] ~ *jP\gY(t)]-
Substitute equations (A9) and (All) in equations (A4) and (A5) to
get:
(A13) log P(t) = - log kP - \3PZ - [gP + \5PZ]T(t)
+ lP log M{t) - hpRN{i) - epgyit),
and
(A14) log v'(0 = Ay + \3y,Z + [gy + \5yZ]T{i) + ^log M(t)
- hyRN(t) - eygY(t)
where
, log kp = log k + AN + (a + \AZ)Ay
gp = gN + («+ KZ)gy
(A15a) 5p = K5N + (a + X4Z)k5y
8p = 8 — (a + y
ep = e — (a + X4Z)ey467 Appendix
and
(A15b)
Ay' Aft 4" Ay
gy' = gN + gy
Similarly, for rate of change equations, substitute equations (A10) and
(A12) into equations (A7) and (A8) to get:
(A16) gP(t) = -gP - K5PZ + iPgM{t) -
-ePD[gy(t)],
and
(A17) gy.(t) = gy. + X5yZ + iygM{t) - hy
-tyD[gy(t)].
So far, we have made no assumptions about income elasticity. Real
income per capita (y) does not enter on the right-hand side of the
equations, but a does in equation (A13) though not equation (A14) (see
equations A15a and A15b). One consequence is that fitting equation
(A13) for the United States and the United Kingdom combined in its
most general form (i.e., a =£ 1 and X4 =£ 0) would require using three
country parameters (\3/>, \4, X5P). This is feasible, since values of a and \4 could be taken from the estimated demand equation for the two coun-
tries, but it would be complex and, in view of our reliance on the
assumption of a = 1 and X4 = 0 in chapter 8, hardly worthwhile. We have
introduced the approximations of equations (All) and (A 12) not to
avoid that assumption but because, even with that assumption, real
income per capita enters the price and output equations. Accordingly, in
what follows we shall, in combining the two countries, proceed as if
a = 1, X4 = 0. The assumption of a = 1 is not implicit in the equations for
each country separately.
A second and more subtle consequence of an a 4 1, affecting the
equations for the separate countries as well as for the two combined, has
to do with the comparability of the equation for nominal income with the
equations for price and output separately. If a = 1 and \4 = 0, then the
sum of equations (A13) and (A14) will, as a mathematical matter, give
equation (A3), for a = 1 and X4 = 0. However, suppose we estimate
equations (A13) and (A14) by straightforward multiple regression. Their
sum will equal the corresponding regression estimate of equation (A3)
with the term in log y(t) omitted only if we impose the cross-equation
conditions that
log kP - Ay. = log k
(A18) X3F - \3y = X3
gp = gy'468 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
that is, conditions on the estimated constant terms and the coefficients of
Z, T, and ZT in equations (A13) and (A14).
If we do not impose any cross-equation conditions, then the sum of the
regressions corresponding to equations (A13) and (A14) will equal
(A19) log Y{i) = - log k - \3Z + gYT{t) + \5T(t)
+ t,\ogM(t)-bRN(t)-€gy(t).
If, empirically, a is close to unity and X4 to zero, then the estimated gY and
\5 will be close to zero. However, there is nothing that requires that
result. Accordingly, to avoid the complexity of introducing cross-
equation conditions, we have introduced terms in Tin the equations for Y
in tables 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6, and in Tand ZT for corresponding equations
for the combined United States and United Kingdom (not reported). As
a result, they do not correspond precisely to those presented in chapter 8.
In effect, this involves indirectly allowing for an a =/= 1.
The same problems arise for the rate of change equations (A16) and
(A17) and mean that in computing these equations for the two countries
combined, we implicitly assume a = 1, X4 = 0; and that in computing the
corresponding equations for the rate of change of nominal income, we
include a constant term plus, for the two countries combined, a term in Z.
9.10.2 Relation of Prices and Output to
Current and Prior Money and Income
If we replace RN by Rs, we can express Rs and D(RS) and gY and D(gY) in terms of earlier money and income by the same procedure as was used
in the appendix to chapter 8. The final result, however, is much more
complicated because, in replacing Rs(t) by k0 + gY*(t) and gY*(t) in turn by its value in terms of earlier money and income, it is necessary to use the
equations for log Y(t), not for log P(t), or log y'(t). Hence the final
equations cannot be obtained, as might at first appear, by simply replac-
ing £ by £/» or £y», 8 by 8P or by>, and so on. Both sets of structural
parameters enter in. However, the final results, on the assumption that
all phases are equal in length, can still be expressed in the same form as
equations (A23) and (A42) of the appendix to chapter S.
46 The results are
46. The steps in the derivation of the equation for log P are as follows:
(i) In equation (A13) of this appendix, with Rs substituted for RN, replace Rs(t) by k0 +
wgY{t) + (1 - w)gUt-l).
[Denote the resulting equation by (i), and similarly for later steps.]
(ii) Do the same in equation (A6) of the appendix to chapter 8, modified by substituting Rs
for RN.
(iii) Write modified equation (A6) of the appendix to chapter 8 for (t-1), and replace
Rs(t-l)byk0 + g*Y(t-l).
(iv) Multiply both sides of equation (iii) by (1 -





log P(t) = aP + a'PT(t) +fPZ +fPZT(t) + bP log M(t) + cP log M(t -l) + dP log Y{t - 1)
+ eP log Y(t-2),
log y'(t) = ay + a'y,T{i) +fy.Z +fyZT(t) + 2ylog M{t) + CylOg M{t - 1) + dylog Y(t ~ 1)
+ ey,logY(t-2),
aP = — log kp - whPk0 + (1 - w)log k
w(w§p + €.P)(\og k + hk0)









= - (1 - w) - \ -£-
and the corresponding coefficients for equation (A21) are
(vi) In equation (v), replace gY(t) by [log Y(t) - log Y(t-l)]ln, and gY (t-1) by the
corresponding expression,
(vii) In equation (vi), replace log Y(t) by its equivalent from equation (A23) of the
appendix to chapter 8.
The procedure for deriving the equation for log y' is the same except starting with
equation (A14) of this appendix instead of equation (A13).470 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
ay = Ay - wbyk0 + (1 - w) log k 8/8
, w(whv + ev)(log k + 8fc0)
nQ
U y' gy'











The corresponding rate of change equations are
(A23) gP(t) = a'P+fPZ + bPgM(t) + cPgM{t - + dPgY(t-l) + ePgy(t-2),
(A24) 8yit) = a'yy y
+ cygM(t - 1) + <*y*y(f - 1) + eygy(r - 2).
As with equations (A13) and (A14) and (A16) and (A17), so with
equations (A20) and (A21) and (A23) and (A24), the equations for the
countries combined implicitly assume a = 1, X4 = 0. For the rate of
change of nominal income for each country separately, the equations
obtained by summing (A23) and (A24) are the same as those computed in
chapter 8 with a constant term (to allow for trend). For the two countries
combined, a term in Z is also required.
9.10.3 Relation of Prices and Output to Current and Prior Money Only
To express equations (A20) and (A21), and (A23) and (A24) in terms
of earlier money alone, we make use of equations (A70) and (A71) of the
appendix to chapter 8. These are for each country separately; that is,
Z = 0, to which we restrict our analysis in this section, as we did in the
corresponding section of the appendix to chapter 8.















b1 =c + bd
bt = dbi-i + ebi_2 f°
r i > 1-
Replacing t by t— 1 and t — 2 successively, we may substitute the results
for log Y{t-\) and log Y(t-2) in equations (A20) and (A21), and for














(A30) bpx = cP + dPb0
bP. = dpbi-i + ePbi_2 for i > 1.
From equation (A30) it follows that
(A31) X bP. = bP + cP + (dp + eP) ]
= bp + Cp + (dp + eP)
b + c
1-d-e'
If Xbi = 1, which has been imposed on the final equations in chapter 8,
then
(A32) bP. = bP + cP + dP + eP for Xb, = 1,
so that the sum of the coefficients of the money and income terms is an
estimate of the fraction of the change in nominal income that ultimately
takes the form of price change. More generally, that fraction is given by472 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output
(A33) g5,(yCp)(ld«) + (<
zbi b + c
The condition that this fraction equal unity, that is, that the whole of a
change in monetary growth ultimately be reflected in prices, is then
(A34) l-dP-ePldl
b + bp + Cp b + c
The equations for output are identical with those for prices, except that
y' replaces P wherever P appears as a subscript.
The sum of the price and output equations estimated separately from
the regressions on current and prior money and prior income will equal
the corresponding equation for income if the latter is estimated without
imposing the restriction that 26, = 1. If that restriction is imposed, then
the separate equations will sum to the income equation only if cross-
equation restrictions are imposed assuring that outcome.
However, the condition that %bP. = 1 can be imposed along with the
condition that 26, = 1, by imposing the condition on the price equation
that bP + cP + dP + eP= 1.
9.10.4 Transient Effects
The treatment of transient effects in the appendix to chapter 8 carries
over directly to prices and output separately, except only that the theoret-
ical value given by equation (A82) of that section applies to the sum of
price and output transient effects.
9.10.5 Alternative Hypotheses about Anticipations
Unchanging Anticipations

















As written, equation (A36) makes gy> a function of current gM only. In
chapter 8 we introduced prior monetary change by making the demand
for money a function of nominal interest rates and nominal interest rates
in turn a function of expected rate of change of nominal income. Howev-
er, a constant g%[ would also imply, in the thoretical model of chapter 2, a473 Appendix
constant gy, and, together with a constant gp, a constant gp. Hence that
analysis gives no reason here to introduce directly prior values of gM in
either equation (A35) or equation (A36). The only justification for doing
so on these assumptions would be to allow for discrepancies between
actual and desired cash balances. Such discrepancies may well be ex-
tremely important for monthly, quarterly, or even annual time units, but
we have so far neglected them for periods as long as our phases, and we
shall continue to do so.
Unchanging Anticipations for Output:
Adaptive Anticipations for Money




the solution of which, as usual, can be approximated, for discrete data, by
(A38) g*M{i) = wgM(t) + (1 - w)gMt - 1),
where, for reasons explained in chapter 8, we treat the phase as a time
unit, even though phases differ in chronological duration, and where we
regard w, the rate of adaptation, as being the same for g% as for gy.
Substitute equation (A38) and its counterpart for gY, in equations (18)
and (19) of the text, which gives
(A39) gP(t) = gy(t) - gp - (1 - W) [gy(t) - g*y(t - 1)]
Ry,
(A40) gy{t) = gp + (1 - TOVKI - w)[gM(t) - gUt - 1)]
Ry. .
Write equations (18) and (19) of the text for (t — 1), multiply by
(1 - w), subtract the results from equations (A39) and (A40), and sim-
plify to get
(A41) gP(t) = - wgp + (1 - w)gP(t - 1) + wgY(t)
+ 71iKl-w)[gM(0-gM('-l)]
+ $\OgRy(t)-(l-w)\OgRy(t-l)],
(A42) gy(t) = Wgp + (1 - W)gy(t - 1)
+ (l-T!)lKl-w)[gM(O-gM('-l)]
-£[\OgRy(t)-(l-w)\OgRy(t-l)].474 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output




The sum of equations (A41; and A42) does not contain the output
ratio. If we divide the sum by (1 - w), the result is
(A43) gy(t) - gy(t - 1) = ^[gM(t) - gM(t - 1) ],
or, dividing by n(t), the interval between the midpoints of phases t and
(A44)
We can use this equation to estimate vj/.
Adaptive Anticipations for both Output and Money:
Rates of Adaptation Equal
The counterpart for output of equation (A38) is:
(A45) gp = w'gy{t) + (1 - w')gp(t - 1),
where w' is the weight attached to current output growth.
The case considered here is one in which the rates of adaptation are
equal for money and output (w = w').
Substitute equations (A38) and (A45), and their counterpart for gY,
into equations (18) and (19) of the text to get:
(A46) gP(t) = wgY(t) + (1 - w)gKt - 1) - w'gy.(t)
-(l-w')gp(t-l)
- w) [gM(t) - gUt -1) ] + € log
(A47) (1 - w')gy(t) = (1 - w')gp(t - 1)
+ (i--n>Ki-H0[gA/(O
- i lOg Ry (0-
For w = w', write equations (18) and (19) of the text for t - 1, multiply
by (1 - w), and subtract from equations (A46) and (A47). After sim-
plification, the result is
(A48) gP(t) - gP(t - 1) = -ni|/[gM(0 - gM(t - 1)]
47. If equation (A41) is expressed in a series of terms, there will appear to be six
regression coefficients, but there are only five independent parameters: w, gp, r\, iji, and 4,
and T| and v}/ only appear as a product, so there are really only four independent parameters.
Similarly, equation (A42) yields five linear regression coefficients, but there are only four
independent parameters, w, g*d2y., (1 —T))I|J, and £.
48. A less rigid approach would be to regard glf as a weighted average of current and
earlier values of gM but without restricting the weights to the exponential form implied by
equation (A38). However, without imposing additional restrictions on the weights, it
becomes difficult or arbitrary to identify i|i separately from the weights.475 Appendix
(A49) g,.(t) - gy,(t - 1) = (1 - in)v|,[gM(r) - gM(t - 1)]
Unlike equations (A41) and (A42), these equations are linear in the
parameters and can be estimated directly.
If £ is set equal to zero, and the equations are divided through by n(t),
equations (A48) and (A49) reduce to
(A50)
(A51) D[gy(t)] = (1 - -n)i]/Z%M(0],
and their sum to equation (A44), the same as the sum of equations (A41)
and (A42), implying the same estimate of 4*.
Adaptive Anticipations for both Output and Money:
Rates of Adaptation Not Equal (w =£ w')
Write equations (18) and (19) of the text for (t - 1), multiply by
(1 - w') and subtract from equations (A46) and (A47) of the preceding
section to get, after some rearrangement,




- w)[gM(t) - gM(t -1)]
-Z[\ogRyit)-(l-w')\ogRy.(t-l)].
Replace g%t{t - 1) and gy{t - 1) by their equivalents for (t - 1) from
equation (A38) and the corresponding equation for gy(t) • Subtract equa-
tions (A52) and (A53) rewritten for (t — 2) and multiplied by (1 — w)
from the resulting equations, The final results are:
(A54) gP(t) = gAt - 1) + (1 - w)[gP(t - 1) - gP(t - 2)]
(1)
+ (T-^ [log Ry.(t) -(1-w) log Ryit-1)]
- £[log RAt-1) - (1-w) log Ry(t-2)],476 Division of Change in Income between Prices and Output








+ C [log Ry{t-1) - (1-w) log Ry(t-2)].
Like equations (A41) and (A42), these equations are nonlinear in the
parameters. The sum of equations (A54) and (A55) is






f x LO I V /
-1)]
(l-w) + w(l-w )
Divide both sides by n(t) to get
T;rj7;K
from which, in principle, it is possible to estimate i}>, w, and w'. In
practice, the estimates are wholly unacceptable.